

**KAROL CARDINAL WOJTYLA
(POPE JOHN PAUL II)
AS PHILOSOPHER AND THE
CRACOW/LUBLIN SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY**

by Josef Seifert

Phenomenological realism is a thematic and systematic endeavor to go back to "things themselves" and, while paying closest attention to the given, to avoid the subjectivistic and idealistic turn of the later Husserl, not uncritically, but by showing that "reality in itself" and the great topics of classical philosophy "reveal themselves from themselves." Phenomenological realism, understood in this sense, could hardly have found more dynamic representatives than it has recently found in Poland, at a time when it was practically forgotten. It was, however, only by the election of K. Cardinal Wojtyla to the papacy that this very dynamic group of Polish philosophers, who were greatly influenced by R. Ingarden but above all inspired by Wojtyla's philosophical work and teaching, emerged as it were from almost complete hiddenness into world publicity. (It should be noted, however, that several articles and main works of K. Wojtyla were already translated into English and French prior to Wojtyla's election. Some were published in the well known series *Analecta Husserliana*, edited by A. T. Tymieniecka.) A careful study of their main works as far as these have been published in English, German, Italian, and French has convinced the present writer that the work done in this school is of the first importance, especially with respect to the realization of the aims outlined in the "Preface" of the first issue of *Aletheia* as goals of this journal. It is therefore a special joy for me to introduce the reader of this journal to some of the main contributions this school has made to philosophy.

**K. CARDINAL WOJTYLA (POPE JOHN PAUL II),
THE ACTING PERSON, DORDRECHT: REIDEL, 1979.**

This work has exerted the greatest influence on the Cracow/Lublin school of philosophy. It has been discussed frequently and is being referred to in the most important works of the Cracovian school.

The present reviewer of *The Acting Person*, after a long and often painstaking study of a text which, at least in the English translation and edition,¹ presents enormous difficulties to

¹. The author of this report has no command whatsoever of the Polish language and is therefore unable to examine the claim made by A. T. Tymieniecka, the editor of the English edition, that the English version constitutes the definitive text of the work.

What is clear is that the author of *The Acting Person* did not have an opportunity to examine the translation of chapter VII and perhaps of other parts of the translation. It is also clear both from Mrs. Tymieniecka's own report and from other sources (including an Italian review of the book, "The 'Acting Person' di Karol Wojtyla, Analisi metafisica dell'uomo," by Andrzej Poltawski, one of the three members of the commission K. Wojtyla had asked to examine the translation) that the translation has not been examined to the full satisfaction of the author prior to its publication. The notes of the book seem often to go in the direction of Prof. Tymieniecka's own thinking as it is manifested in some of her published works, instead of clarifying the author's thought. From the comments on the translation (by Poltawski in his review of the book) it seems clear that the Commission (composed of Dean Jaworski, Poltawski, and Styczen) had arrived at the same judgment but that the results of their examinations were not incorporated in the English text.

Professor Tymieniecka, who edits the *Phenomenology Information Bulletin*, gives in vol. 3, October 1979, of this Bulletin, an extremely detailed and rather surprising account of the history of the English edition of *The Acting Person*. She describes the book as the fruit of the "collaboration of two authors" (Wojtyla and herself), and speaks even of a "division of authorship" (p. 22;38). These and similar statements raise many questions which the writer of this review cannot solve because he can neither compare the English text with the Polish original nor obtain a first hand report concerning the opinion of the author of *The Acting Person* on the English text and on its history.

At any rate, the style and manner of thinking of the author seems to be much "simpler" and clearer than it appears at times from the "definitive" English version of the text. Without being acquainted with the Polish original, I formed an impression of the author's own style of philosophizing from studying French and German translations of his works as well as from comparing the original version of ch. vii of the English translation with the "improved version" which was not examined by the author: both are contained in the English text edited by Tymieniecka.

the reader, arrived at the conclusion that this work is a major philosophical contribution to the philosophy and phenomenology of the person and that its author is truly among the greatest living philosophers.

The importance of the book can be gathered already from the explicitly declared purpose to “face the major issues themselves concerning life, nature and existence of the human being ... directly as they present themselves to man, ...” (VII). Such a genuinely philosophical attitude of a return to “things themselves” is not only verbally stated but the living reality of this attitude permeates the whole work and gives to it its unique flavor. That such an approach is audacious today, since the author does not restrict himself to commentaries on, or historical studies of, past thinkers, and since he does not even attempt to approach reality by the sole mediation of interpreting “great books,” is stated by the author himself:

First of all, audacious though it may seem at the present day — in which philosophical thinking is not only nourished by, and based upon, history, but in which 'to philosophize' often means to reflect upon theories about theories — the present work cannot be seen otherwise than as a personal effort by the author to disentangle the intricacies of a crucial state of affairs and to clarify the basic problems involved. (VII)

The importance of the book is increased by the fact that the philosophy of the person is of paramount importance. The author himself sees his effort to philosophically understand the self-given 'reality of the person as “a turn toward the most interesting ‘thing itself’ (*zurück zum Gegenstand*) which is precisely the human being as subject.” (XIV)

I do not know any work in contemporary philosophy which addresses itself in an equally original way to this key topic of metaphysics and to an issue of such significance for ethics: the person. It is perhaps not since the time of Augustine that a philosopher as deeply committed to the truth and to the great philosophical tradition as Wojtyła has moved so far beyond a metaphysics of being and substance in general, and gone into the metaphysics of the personal being as actualized in consciousness and freedom. And while Augustine's profound insights into the nature of the person, deeply inspired by Plotinus, are inserted in theological contexts (notably in *De Trinitate*), *The Acting Person* is a “purely” philosophical work which applies a rigorous phenomenological-philosophical method to its topic.

When compared with other great contemporary philosophical works which address the issue of the person as a central topic, e.g. M. Scheler's *Formalismus* or Sartre's and Heidegger's main works, Wojtyła's book not only focuses much more clearly on the theme of the person, but it proceeds from a much closer contact with the reality of the person. It stays not only free from the errors, exaggerations and irrational theories and statements about the person in which most contemporary philosophical books abound, but it links insights of modern phenomenological (especially Schelerian) philosophy to discoveries of the Aristotelian-Thomistic and Augustinian tradition of philosophy.² Thus it achieves, above and beyond its own originality, a universal dimension as it is rarely found in contemporary philosophical works.

Yet the book is by no means a mere synthesis of insights gained by others, interpreted in light of the author's original contact with reality. Rather, the book is full of discoveries which properly belong to its author. The philosophical originality of the work manifests itself especially in the deliberate attempt to overcome a one-sidedness in the philosophical approach to the person which has dominated philosophy since Descartes, but which actually goes back to Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy.³ The one-sidedness in question lies in approaching the person primarily through knowledge and cognition. The book *The Acting Person* tries to correct this one-sidedness by viewing the person primarily as he manifests himself in action, and action as it reveals the person. This approach itself is highly original; so are those

Whatever may be the exact nature of the facts surrounding the origin of the English text of the work, we owe an immense debt of gratitude to Professor Tymieniecka for having made available to the English speaking world a very important philosophical work.

² P. VII, V111, X111-XIV.

³ Although both Plato and Aristotle seem to indulge in an “intellectualistic interpretation of the person,” Plato clearly suggests in the *Theaetetus*, *Republic*, *Laws*, *Eutyphro* and other dialogues that God (gods) is (are) the justest being(s) possible. Therefore, man becomes good to the extent to which he becomes similar to the god. Aristotle, on the other hand, does in no way include the perfection of the will or moral virtue in his notion of the divine unmoved mover and He defends therefore a far more intellectualistic interpretation of the person or of rational beings than Plato.

philosophical investigations in the book which elucidate the essence of freedom and of “man-acts.”

As we shall see, however, the book is free from a voluntaristic misinterpretation of the person which severs the link between will and reason, between action and truth. To be sure, the emphasis on the person as revealed through his free acts (actions) is intended to be more than merely complementary to the traditional and modern emphasis on the person as a rational, *knowing* being. The thesis clearly seems to be that in acting as it involves free self-possession, self-determination, and self-governance, the person qua person realizes and shows himself most profoundly, especially in the morally good action. Just how far the author would go in de-emphasizing the role of intellect for the understanding of the person qua person does not quite clearly emerge from the text. We shall return to this point later.

PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD AND EXPERIENCE

In the methodologically very significant *Introduction* it is asserted in good phenomenological and Aristotelian fashion that *experience* is, or at least ought to be, the starting point for the philosophical exploration of the person. What is said there about the experience of the person not only throws into relief the unique moments of the experience of consciousness which are peculiar to the experience of the person alone, but also modifies the general theories of the role of experience found both in the Aristotelian and in the phenomenological tradition.

It is said about the experience of man that it is the richest and apparently most complex experience accessible to us and that, furthermore, any experience man has of something outside of himself is always linked to the experience of man himself.

The last point seems to apply exclusively to the experience each man has of himself alone. Everything which we experience is given through our own acts of perceiving, understanding, etc., and thus there is no experience whatsoever of something outside of ourselves which does not imply an experience of ourselves. Now the question arises whether this point is the reason for the other thesis just mentioned that the experience of man is the richest accessible to man.

If this thesis were simply a logical consequence of the undeniable fact that we cannot experience *any* being outside ourselves except in and through experiencing (also) ourselves, it could undoubtedly be asserted that the experience man has of himself is the richest and most complex experience. But if it were asserted that any being and content which we experience as something over and against us presents our experience with a qualitatively less complex, deep, or rich content than we are ourselves, this thesis would of course not be true and is also not at all, as far as I can tell, what the author of *The Arcing Person* intends to say. For obviously the experience of other personalities who are superior to ourselves is — at least in many ways — a richer experience than the experience of ourselves albeit perhaps never as complex as the experience each man has of himself. Even if “experience of man” were meant here already in the sense developed later as experience of man in other men as well as in ourselves, it could hardly be said that the object of the experience of what Plato calls the ideas, or the experience of God of a religious person who is confronted with the “Holy,” or of a mystic, who “experiences God,” is less rich than the experience of man. Quite on the contrary, man experiences human nature as afflicted by evils and limited, as infinitely inferior to an infinitely good and holy being, and certainly also as falling short of realizing the perfection contained in the (Platonic) ideas.

But perhaps the author means that there is no real being in the world with which we stand in experiential contact and which is as rich as man; that, whatever else may be the object of human experience in some sense (Ideas and Ideals in the sense of the Platonic *eide* or Forms, religious objects of experience, etc.), these are not fully objects of *experience* and are not given to us in the wealth and diversification in which man is experienced by man. No being which is directly accessible to our “normal” experience in the world, such as animals, plant,, or works of art, etc., is of as rich a content as man. (Insofar as art is concerned, this last point, too, would require further explanation.)

Besides, the experience of man “in ourselves” is always present in all our other experiences; it is not an object or being which might appear in the field of our experience and

might then disappear again, as all other beings and objects. It stays always with us and mediates to us all other experiences. In these senses, then, the experience of man is the most complex and the richest one.

Another thesis about the experience of man advanced in *The Acting Person* is that the notion of experience should be understood as including not only some sensual and instinctual “awareness” or sense-experience but also a cognitive relation to being. Hence man *experiences* himself also in the form of facing himself cognitively in self-cognition and self-knowledge. The cognitive relation to a being is not outside the sphere of experience, is not an opposite to it but rather an essential part of it. This thesis has profound philosophical implications. For both in empiricism and in Kant we find an opposition between experience and cognition. Experience is reduced either to amorphous sense-impressions or to sense-perceptions (as formed by some basic laws of association or by the apriori forms of intuition: temporality and spatiality). Thinking seems then to “form” experience, in fact to superimpose structures upon experience which deviate from it or at least originate in something else than experience (a transcendental structure of the ego).

Wojtyła seems concerned with showing that thinking and especially cognition as establishing a rational contact with being is not only itself an experience (which Kant or Hume could hardly deny) but that it also belongs to the *experience of objects*, to the integrated wholeness of the *experience* of the world. Applied to the experience a man has of himself, the point under discussion might also imply the further observation that man never experiences himself solely as subject but always faces himself as object of consciousness, in the reflective function of consciousness and (at least potentially) in self-knowledge. We shall return to this point later.

Another reflection of the author turns to the perplexing duality of continuity and discontinuity of experience. Not only is the experience of man always of the same “object” although human nature is given to us in innumerable different “incarnations,” but experience — although interrupted by sleep, loss of consciousness, etc. — is also characterized normally by a continuity through memory and other forms of unification in virtue of which all the diverse experiences contribute to *one* continuous experience.

Of special significance is the emphasis on the fact that experience must not be phenomenologically and sensualistically misinterpreted as a set of sensations and emotions which are ordered only later, nor as an experience of hopeless diversity of individual impressions which in and of themselves lack any unity of universality. Rather, the unity of our experience is established not only *in the subjects* by means of continuity of consciousness and memory, but also *in the objects* by the presence of universal natures in them. While it must be granted to nominalism, empiricism, or positivism that there is a uniqueness and irrepeatability in each experience, in each phase, element, and object of the experience of the concrete world, it must also not be overlooked that the universal nature of things makes its appearance *in* the experienced objects or, put more simply, that the universal nature of things is itself experienced. Wojtyła thereby hints at facts which, we might add, both the Humean and the Kantian misinterpretation of experience overlooked, an oversight which had tremendous philosophical consequences.

The nature of man emerges not merely as the end result of all experiences which we have with ourselves and with other men; rather, the essence of man, the universal nature of man is also present in *each* individual experience of ourselves and of other human beings. This observation expresses a point dear both to the Aristotelian and the phenomenological philosopher. (However, whether this “presence” of the universal nature of a being in each individual is not only an objective fact but also presents itself to our experience and immediate knowledge, depends on the degree of necessity and intelligibility of an essence, as other phenomenologists have shown.)

The investigations of the *Acting Person* then turn from the experience of man in and through the experience of ourselves to the experience of man gained through other human beings who stand in relation to us. It is asserted that other men are *objects* of my experience. Object means here of course not that they are given to us like things, like “objects” in a sense in which this term precisely refers to non-personal beings. Rather, what is implied is that we ourselves are the only being which is given to us as subject in an experience “from within,” in an amazingly intimate fashion at which already Augustine marveled. No other being, and also no other human person, is given to us as “subject” in this sense, but each other person stands over against us. This last assertion of Wojtyła, which contradicts some of Scheler's theses

about the impossibility of ever making any person an “object” of experience and knowledge, seems to me to express a very important and correct observation.⁴

The genuine experience of man gained through our contact with other human beings does not, however, merely confront us with the “same” object of experience which we encounter in the experience of ourselves: man, human nature. Rather, our experience of man becomes richer the more men we know. Yet, this greater wealth of experience is to be understood not only quantitatively. In sharp distinction from the experience of many factory-made chairs, where the experience of any new chair is only quantitatively “more” experience, the experience of each new human being, especially when we get more intimately acquainted with the other person, unfolds before us the essence of man more richly. The universal nature of man is understood by Wojtyła not only as a general nature which as such is wholly contained in each individual of a kind and can be abstracted from it; but, the universal nature of man also seems to be understood as embodying a wealth that cannot be fully contained in any individual “exemplar” of the human species but which in a mysterious fashion transcends each man and reveals itself only gradually in and through the experience of more and more unique individual human beings. Thus the universal nature is not exclusively an “abstract” specific structure of human beings which is as it were emptied of all the wealth of individuals; it rather contains in a mysterious fashion *all* the wealth found in individual men.

This understanding of “universal nature” would also seem to accord a special function to poetry and art in general because they may unfold this “concrete universality,” which cannot be reduced to an “abstract universal.” (Some of the finest reflections of Hegel on the relation between the universal and the particular go in the same direction as Wojtyła's remarks.)

A third source of experiencing man (apart from the experience of man “in ourselves” and “in other men”) lies in scientific and extra-scientific “communications” inasmuch as they lead us to a closer contact with human nature. Not only — this is a matter of course — does the understanding of these communications constitute an experience of what man does, writes or thinks; but philosophy, science, or art may also lead us to further acquaintance with hitherto unnoticed facts about man or with depth-dimensions of man which are not accessible to us in “ordinary experience” and which must be mediated to us through philosophy and art. Even when the knowledge acquired in science or philosophy belongs to the domain of theoretical knowledge (as distinct from experience, in virtue of its “abstractness”), this knowledge may enhance our experiential contact with man and lead to a deeper experience of man. Thus, there is a mutual interpenetration of experience and intellectual knowledge as well as a “dialectical” relation between them, such that experience is presupposed for theoretical knowledge and theoretical knowledge makes possible new experience. That the experience of man through art is authentic *experience* of man and cannot be replaced by the experience of man achievable without art goes without saying, but art and theory may also present us with theses which go beyond the scope of our experience or which contradict experience. Yet, while books and other works may present distortions of the nature of man and therefore lead us away from what deserves the name “experience of man,” these works can also elucidate and thereby enrich the experience of human nature. Philosophical works, for example, may disclose to us aspects of the nature of man which we never consciously noticed before or they may clarify our experience, bringing it to a new stage and level of cognitive lucidity. Scientific works, and even more so art may present us with unknown facts or imaginary examples of human nature, and in many other specifically “artistic” manners deepen our experience of man. The question of how various limitations, distortions, or lies about the experience of man in scholarly or other works may be overcome and what are the criteria for valid and invalid “experiences of man,” is not further elaborated in *The Acting Person*.⁵

After having discussed these various dimensions of the experience of man, the author further emphasizes the fact that there is a difference of such exceeding magnitude between the

⁴ In various works, especially in my book, *Leib und Seele. Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen Anthropologie* (Salzburg, 1973), p 45 ff., I tried to render evident that not only other persons but also we ourselves can become objects of our thought (reflection) and knowledge.

⁵ Various phenomenological authors have made decisive contributions towards the clarification of the problem of how the philosopher proceeds from experience and grasps in and through experience the intelligible and necessary essences of things (*eide*). I think here especially of D. von Hildebrand, *What is Philosophy?* 2nd edition (Chicago, 1970) ch. iv; *Ethics*, 2nd edition (Chicago 1972), “Prolegomena”, *Das Wesen der Liebe* (Stuttgart, 1971), “Prolegomena. In my essay, “Essence and Existence” (in: *Aletheia, I, 1*, 1977), I also discussed various other contributions towards a phenomenological epistemology of the apriori.

experience we have of ourselves and the experience we have of others that the use of the term “experience” in order to indicate these two phenomena becomes ambiguous and almost equivocal (5-6). In a manner reminiscent of Augustine’s philosophy of consciousness, Wojtyla ponders the question whether both of these experiences may be properly called “experience of man.”

The question is answered in the affirmative. This leads Wojtyla to a new observation about the experience of man which further demonstrates the importance of the second unifying moment in experience which was discussed above. Experience of man, even of ourselves, is *never* exclusively the experience of an individual being. It is always simultaneously the experience of a basic unity (man, human nature) which is given in and with each experience of an individual man. This fact, however, constitutes a reference of all experience of man to a stabilizing element which synthesizes and unifies each experience in a manner which could never be established on the mere level of sense. Even when the acts which are necessary to understand this unity in the object of experience or which ground this “intellectual” unity of human experience itself are not to be interpreted as apriori knowledge, they must in any case be some acts of mental discrimination and classification which transcend the level of sense. Hence, intellect forms an integral part of the human experience or *forms human experience* in such a way that its role is indispensable if we are still to be faced with *human* experience in the strict sense.

Perhaps this observation of the author can be illustrated by the important dimension of human experience which B. Schwarz has called the “experience *as ...*” When we see a dog, we recognize this being *as* a dog, when we see a man, we perceive him *as* a human being, etc. In other words, the most common human experiences are not solely the experience of an individual being insofar as it is given to sense, but they are also the experience of a particular being “in light of” a universal form or nature. Even when we see a particular being for the first time (for example, a strange animal in a zoo) and have no clear knowledge of the species to which it belongs, we will at least have some knowledge of there being such a species, and some “negative” knowledge of those species to which the perceived being cannot belong.

To return to the important distinction between the experience of our own being and that of other persons, one of the most striking observations of Wojtyla is the thesis of the “simultaneity of inner and outer experience of man.”

What is an “outer experience” or an experience from the outside? It seems to be the type of experience which we have first of all of other human beings who are not “I myself.” It is the experience of a human being as “standing over against me,” as “object” in the sense discussed above.

“Inner experience” of man would correspondingly be above all that experience which we have of ourselves “from within,” when we “live” our own acts and experiences from within, being their subjects. “Inner experience” of man is that experience which no man can *really* share with another man.

These two forms of the experience of man are however in no way opposed to each other; they mutually enhance and complement each other and give us a more complete experience of man. One could perhaps even say that the one kind of experience of man could not be had without the other. That this thesis cannot be refuted by the possibility that a man would (consciously) live alone in a world in which he never would encounter another human being, is seen in light of another profound insight expressed in *The Acting Person*.

No person has exclusively an “inner experience” of his own being; he never has *only* the experience of living his conscious being *from* within. Rather, I experience myself also in the mode of “outer experience” when I reflect back over myself, know myself, etc. (The exploration of this dual mode of experiencing man as it is also found in the experience each man has of himself constitutes a major portion of *The Acting Person*, as we shall see.)

Moreover, while the immediate and full experience of man “from within” is given to each person only in regard to his own being, the givenness of the “inner experience” of man is not restricted to my experience of myself. It is possible to grasp in some fashion the inner experience another person has of himself. Of course, the aspect of the “inner experience of man” which is given to us in another human being differs decisively from the aspect of the “inner experience of man” which is accessible to us exclusively in ourselves. Yet, as especially acts of compassion and love presuppose, there are some forms of man’s participating in another man’s “inner experience,” by getting a *grasp* of that experience which he alone has of himself. This getting to know his inner experience of himself is always mediated to us through the

“outer experience” we have of him when we perceive him, understand what he says, interpret his expression, etc., while we have an “inner experience” of ourselves prior to any such “mediation.” In addition, precisely when we understand new aspects of the “inner experience” of man in *another* person, we grasp that only for him are these experiences an “inner experience,” while we grasp them as it were “from without.” For example, the inner peace of soul, exuberant joy, despair, etc. of another person are immediately experienced “from within” *only* by him. But precisely in order for us to know this, we must have some mediated contact with *another* person's inner experience. We are not restricted to viewing the other's experience as it presents itself to the “outside” as it were. Rather, we can have a true although limited comprehension of how the other person's experience is given to him in the mode of “inner experience.” In fact, completely new dimensions of the inner experience of man may reveal themselves to us through another person, e.g., torment, despair, restlessness, sense of humor, kindness, courage, etc., as we may never have gotten to know them within our own inner experience of ourselves. New dimensions of the inner experience of man may be revealed to us also through “objectified works,” such as literary works, music, painting, etc., as well as through psychological or philosophical treatises. The ability to comprehend, and even to place ourselves in some fashion inside, another person's “inner experience” is also crucially significant for the art of acting, as especially Stanislavski has seen and perhaps emphasized in a one-sided manner in his important theoretical writings on the art of acting.

The distinction between the various modes of the experience of man must not lead us to the wrong impression that the experience of man is something quite complicated and dispersed which lacks any inner unity. On the contrary, precisely through the diversity of its dimensions the intrinsic simplicity of the experience of man is attained. This observation in *The Acting Person* is of great importance and allows application to many other fields of reality and philosophical research. Often it is precisely the recognition of difference and diversity which leads to the understanding of unity and which is even presupposed for the understanding of unity. Monisms of all kinds lose sight of this fact.⁶

Particularly the aforementioned interpenetration between empirical-sensual and intellectual moments does not lead to a severing and dividing up of experience but to its inner unity. This unity has to be conceived as an organic interpenetration of such moments which are accessible only through the senses, and other elements of the object and act of experience which can only be given through the intellect. These elements are by no means severed from each other but united both in the man whom we experience as “object” and in man as subject of experience.

One of the indubitable givens of experience can be described as “man-acts.”⁷ This expression is used by the author in order to indicate that it is not mere isolated actions (not to mention Humean “impressions”) which we experience and the subject of which would only be inferred from them as empiricist phenomenalism would have us believe. Not only the surface of man or “experiences” understood as divorced from a subject are given, but also man himself, the “dynamic unity” of “man-acts” is clearly given (9-10). But how is it given in experience? and how is the datum “man-acts” approached in Wojtyła's work?

In the first place, action is a particular moment and a particularly suitable vehicle of apprehending the person. This is so because of the close relationship between person and act which unfolds in a two-fold manner: 1. There is no action without person. (Certainly there are many activities of biological and instinctual nature which exist outside the world of the person, in plants and animals. Many of these activities or instinctual activations also go on in man. But *action* is a term which is reserved precisely for the unique form of activity which necessarily presupposes a person.) Nevertheless, *action* cannot simply be translated as “personal act” or as “act of the person qua person.” For, as we shall see, there are other acts (e.g., knowledge) which are specifically personal but which are not actions. The term action then is narrower

⁶. This point seems to be of extreme philosophical significance for all areas of philosophical research. I became especially aware of its crucial importance when I worked on two books on the body-mind-problem.

⁷. The author seems to imply here a direct and immediate experience of freedom which is an essential element of “action” in his sense. But if we have, as I am convinced, an immediate grasp of both the essence and the existence of freedom in us, how does this position relate to the later thesis of the book that we have no (immediate) experience of the soul?

See J. Seifert, *Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der gegenwärtigen philosophischen Diskussion. Eine kritische Analyse* (Darmstadt 1979), for a similar attempt at a synthesis between the phenomenological insights into the person and the classical “substance-theory” of the person.

than the term “act”; it refers to a specific characteristic domain of personal acts which are, as we shall see later, distinguished by freedom, which is not present in all specifically personal acts. At the same time, “action” is a broader term than “deed.” It seems to mean *all* free personal acts, not only deeds which aim at the realization of a state of facts outside the person. 2. While the person is the ontological condition for action, action reveals the person who is the agent. In fact, action is an excellent vehicle of grasping the person. This is one of the most central theses of the work, *The Acting Person*. The book is not a study of the action of man as such. Rather, it studies the action of man insofar as it discloses the person; it looks at the person through the action. Of course, as a philosophical work, *The Acting Person* does not look at any unique individual person who reveals himself through his action, as a historical or psychological work might do. Rather, the author studies the general grounds for the fact that each concrete person reveals himself in a particularly clear manner through his actions and that we can therefore get to know a person especially through his actions (a term which is understood here broadly enough so as to cover all specifically free acts).

Wojtyła appropriates here an important insight of M. Scheler who criticized the traditional view that the person is a substance largely on the ground that the person is not a “thing *behind*” all acts but rather is a living experienced “act-center” accessible in experience and in no way untouched by the content of acts. At the same time, as we shall see, Wojtyła's rethinking of the relation between person and action allows him to rehabilitate the classical notion of substance in such a way that he can reconcile with the Schelerian discoveries the conviction that the person is a substance.⁸

Wojtyła's thesis remains “revolutionary,” insofar as he holds that action gives us the best insight into the person, better than acts of cognition or knowledge. This thesis is directed both against Descartes (explicitly) and against Aristotle (implicitly). The present reviewer is convinced that the critique of the intellectualistic Western understanding of the person (as a “rational animal,” a term in which “rationality” is primarily conceived in light of intellectual cognitive understanding) is justified. For in knowledge the person is the recipient of being, he actively appropriates to himself what things are. They disclose themselves to him. And in spite of the fact that knowledge is of absolutely crucial significance for understanding the person and constitutes the ground of his whole intellectual, free, and spiritual life, knowledge as such is not, as Aristotle holds, the highest perfection of man nor is it that which constitutes the highest value. Rather, as Wojtyła clearly indicates, the *person insofar as he acts freely*, the “man-acts” brings out more fully what is “in man,” and discloses to us more properly the essence of the person.⁹

Again, action is conceived here so broadly that it also includes free attitudes such as virtues or vices. Moreover, the real importance of action as revealing the person cannot be understood in terms of a morally neutral consideration of human actions. Such a consideration we find in Heidegger's notion of “*Eigentlichkeit*” (“authenticity”) in which, e.g., hate and love are conceived as co-equal manifestations of authenticity.¹⁰ In my view, *The Acting Person* breaks with this Heideggerian understanding of authenticity in asserting that moral goodness and evilness are intrinsic features of human action. Morality is intrinsic to human actions. In fact, Wojtyła goes so far as to assert that moral goodness and evilness constitute the specific profile of actions *as* personal actions. Hence ethics and anthropology are intimately intertwined in *The Acting Person*.

Wojtyła does not merely select the second relation between person and act (action as revealing the person) for the purposes of his book. Rather, he thinks that the analysis of this relation between act and person leads to a more ultimate understanding of the person than the study of the general metaphysical relation in virtue of which the action ontologically *presupposes* the person. *Actions are the best starting point for grasping the dynamic character of the person*. Hence Wojtyła moves from the action to the person, not from the person to the

⁸. See M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (Gesammelte Werke, Bd.11) fifth edition (Bern 1966) p. 294- 376, 412, 415, 416, 421 f., 430, 451.

⁹. As we shall see, Wojtyła is far from taking a voluntaristic stance on the person in the sense of divorcing man's freedom from his intellect. He sees action and freedom as essentially ordained towards the truth about being and the good. But I think his position constitutes a genuine break-through and criticism of the Aristotelian position insofar as it recognizes that moral goodness is of higher value than intellectual cognition as such. Action in the sense of any free act actualizes the person more deeply, brings out more “what is in the person” than intellectual acts, which according to the mistaken intellectualism of Aristotle actualize the deepest being of the person.

¹⁰. This is evident even more clearly in Heidegger's book on *Nietzsche* than in *Being and Time*.

act. That this is a better starting point can be seen in light of the fact that moral values constitute the highest values of the person and *dwell in the person* (12). The person himself becomes good or evil through his actions. Hence the person does not only stand at the origin of his actions (because all actions presuppose the person) but also at their outcome.

This profound metaphysics of the person seems to reach a genuine synthesis of some important contributions of perennial philosophy (on the substantiality of the person) and Scheler's insights concerning the dynamic unity between act and person.

The author states quite clearly that *The Acting Person* is *not* a treatise on ethics. The focus of the work is the person; the person is elucidated, not presupposed. But this elucidation of the person *qua* person cannot prescind from the ethical understanding of man but must approach the person through the dynamic, existential, and, we may add, metaphysical aspects of morality.

Another part of the *Introduction* returns to the general problem of the methods of knowledge used in philosophy. The author refers to induction (*epagogé*) in the Aristotelian sense, reinterpreted in an original manner. *Epagogé* (induction) is understood as a process of arriving through a multiplicity of data to a grasp of "essential sameness," not as a form of inference (reasoning). (One could ask the critical question whether this concept of "induction" is not too broad and would be as applicable to various forms of what is also usually called induction, as to the phenomenological intuition of essences which are characterized by inner necessity, as well as to all forms of intuitive grasp in art, in the psychological cognition of other persons, etc. Perhaps the author deliberately wants to keep the notion of "induction" open to all these possibilities.)

In the subsequent section of the introduction a highly original interpretation of "abstraction" is presented. Abstraction is understood as a focusing on universal sameness while retaining the wealth of experience in mind. The book seems to suggest the need for a rethinking of abstraction in an attempt to incorporate some Hegelian as well as phenomenological epistemological contributions. However, this section is not further developed.

Besides *induction* (in the modified sense referred to above) reduction is declared to be the second decisive method of philosophy to be employed in *The Acting Person*. This method assumes the givenness of action and of the acting person as an irreducible datum and as something of which all of us have a constant pretheoretical awareness. Nevertheless, our constant awareness of "the acting person" has to be brought into the full light of consciousness (A very similar line of thought on the philosophical *prise de conscience* has been developed by Maritain and von Hildebrand.)¹¹ The methods in the service of "reduction" are *analytic argument*, i.e., a careful analysis of an essence and of the features which characterize it, and *reductive understanding*. The latter term does not mean reduction in the common sense as reducing the wealth and essence of a being to another thing. On the contrary, reduction is conceived by the author as the opposite of such a reductionistic impoverishment of things brought about by the "nothing-but method." To "reduce" in the author's terminology means to bring out more fully the wealth of experience; to develop the moments of the original experience more continuously and to grasp more clearly their inner unity and logical-ontological coherence in the essence of the thing in question. To "reduce" means here to achieve a *prise de conscience* and to ascend to the higher unity of the essence in which the link and unity between the different moments of experience can be understood more fully. Reducing in this sense involves a going back to the intelligibility of the essence under consideration. Moreover, to "reduce" requires that one convert to all suitable arguments and items of evidence, reasons, explanations, and interpretations which may elucidate the content of the original experience in such a manner as to remain faithful to the given.

The reviewer is somewhat puzzled by a passage (18-19) in the English text of *The Acting Person* in which the divergence between outer and inner experience of man is related to the difference between behavioristic and subjective approach. The behavioristic approach would concentrate exclusively on the "outer aspect" of human action, the "subjective approach" on the inner experience of man. This remark seems puzzling because, while it is of course true that behaviorism neglects or rejects completely the "inner experience" of man, the behavioristic meaning of "outer" is radically different from the meaning of "outer" the reviewer believes is used in the *Acting Person*. Behaviorism means by the "outer aspect" of man, the mere physical

¹¹. See note 5.

behavior of man. It precisely prescind from any grasp of another person's conscious life "from without." It prescind equally from any knowledge of our own conscious life as something *of* which we have consciousness in self-cognition and reflection, etc. The author of the *Acting Person*, however, seems to have in mind with the "outer experience" of man primarily the experience of the whole other person as standing over against us. including the case in which our own conscious life stands over against us. As we shall see, "inner experience" of man refers to the "subjective" experience in the sense of the intimate interior conscious living of the person's life "from within," the "performing" our life consciously. But this "inner experience" of man, it seems, is "subjective" in the sense of referring to the person-qua subject. Thus it has no connotations of "subjectivity" in the sense of denying objective reality and of interpreting man in light of a relativistic philosophy. Such subjectivism seems to be, moreover, a falsification of the "outer experience" of man rather than to have reference to "subjectivity" in Wojtyła's sense.

The behavioristic notion of "objectivity" in the sense of a thing and of materially determined "physical" behavior as contrasted with the personal life of the conscious subject (i.e., the person) seems quite different from Wojtyła's positive notion of "objectivity" which means both that which "really is the case" and that which is given to the person as standing over against him. (These are two distinct senses of objectivity which play an important role in the investigations of *The Acting Person*.)

Also, "subjectivity" in the sense of a person's intimate experience of, and acquaintance with, his own being "from within" seems quite different from subjectivity in the negative senses of "subjectivism."

The last section of the *Introduction* throws into relief even further the phenomenological character of *The Acting Person*. It is stressed that the aspect of consciousness is decisive and has to be taken into consideration in order to understand the human action (19). The person manifests himself, and his action manifests itself, always through consciousness. With this statement (20) the author means of course more than the general fact that every being manifests itself to knowledge - only when there is a conscious subject who grasps being. What is meant seems to be that the very action of man as personal action *realizes itself* only in and through consciousness. Without consciousness the reality of personal action (and of the person insofar as he stands at the outcome of the action) could not exist because the reasons, motivations, and structural moments of personal action involve consciousness (20). The phenomenological approach is explicitly declared to be the distinguishing trait of the author's presentation of the person which focuses on consciousness and action (21).

The philosopher today cannot rest satisfied with only appropriating and repeating what has already been seen and said about man. Man awaits a deeper knowledge of himself. He desires to overcome the multiplicity of dispersed pieces of partial knowledge concerning himself; above all, he aspires to overcome the forgetfulness of *himself* which characterizes so many branches of anthropological "knowledge" today. Moreover, in light of the growth of partial knowledge and of new philosophical insights, a new synthesis and analysis of man is called for. Man has to avoid the sense that he is commonplace, and ought to approach the inquiry into his nature with a spirit of wonder as it characterises all true philosophy (21-22).

Human Act (ion)

In the first major portion of the book, entitled "Consciousness and Efficacy," the author engages in a study of what is meant by "action." He relates his understanding back to the traditional notion of *actus humanus* (human-personal action). Only man's deliberate (free) acting is called action, nothing else. Thus the *actus humanus* must be distinguished from the *actus hominis* (act of man); the latter only occurs in man and is not a distinguishing human (personal) activity. To sneeze would be a mere *actus hominis*, not an *actus humanus* in the sense of a specifically human (personal) action.

At the same time, it would also be incorrect to translate "*actus humanus*" simply as "personal act" because this Latin term is used (by the tradition and by Wojtyła), not to distinguish in general personal acts from those activations which are not specifically personal; rather, only *within* the domain of *spontaneous activities* one distinguishes non-personal activities from *actus humani*, i.e., from *actions* which are specifically personal. Thus an action

(*actus humanus*) is a purposeful and deliberate acting. Yet it seems to us that also all *inner* free acts — which are not “purposeful” in the sense in which this implies the use of means and at least the intention of realizing something outside the action itself — are to be counted as *actus humani* (actions) in the author's sense. Thus Wojtyła seems to base his analysis — and this is important — on a much broader notion of action than the one which is frequently used by phenomenological authors who would distinguish free *acts* and attitudes *within* the person from *actions* which are *transeunt* (i.e., they aim at the realization of some state of facts outside the action itself).¹²

The *actus humanus* is also defined as *actus voluntarius*” and thus this term seems clearly to be applicable to all free personal acts of man. In saying (26) that nothing can interfere with the act of the will (i.e., action), the author even *primarily* seems to mean the “interior free acts” ‘when he speaks of action. This has to be the case because those human actions which involve the realization of states of affairs outside the agent imply elements which are not within the sole power of the free agent.¹³ Hence it is quite possible that someone might interfere with actions in this sense.

Mirroring Function of Consciousness

The author of *The Acting Person* tries to comprehend the human action both as a *conscious* acting and as the realization of a potentiality of and in the person. Thus the phenomenological exploration of *conscious acting* is linked with the classical Aristotelian metaphysics according to which being stands between potency and act.

Wojtyła offers the finest and subtlest analysis of the theme “consciousness and action” of which I am aware.

First, he shows that one has to make a distinction between *conscious acting* and consciousness *of* acting. In the sphere of our conscious actions we find two dimensions of consciousness. On the one hand, there is the immanent conscious character of the action itself which corresponds to the adjectival meaning of “conscious.” Each action is itself a conscious activity. Consciousness is in it, is an immanent constitutive element of it. On the other hand, we are not only acting consciously but we also possess consciousness *that* we are acting, and that we are acting consciously.

This consciousness that we are acting does not resemble the awareness which we may have of activities which are not conscious in themselves, as when we are aware of biological occurrences which take place in us. In contradistinction to this case, the awareness that we are **acting** is inseparable from the awareness that we are acting consciously. In all human consciousness we find the consciousness immanent to the lived conscious activity itself and simultaneously a “reflective” element of consciousness. This reflective element is perhaps the ontological foundation of the possibility of explicit reflection as a bending back over our own acts, but it is prior to reflection in the proper sense. It is an element of what other philosophers have called *Vollzugsbewußtsein*¹⁴: namely the element of getting to know our own being and experiences while we live them consciously.

This getting acquainted with our experiences seems to be an element which is clearly distinct, although inseparable, from the immanent consciousness which characterizes the activity itself. Compared with the latter, the “getting acquainted with our experiences” is already a consciousness of something, rather than being a “conscious something,” as the human action itself. Conscious in the adjectival or adverbial sense refers to an immanent predicate of an act. Consciousness as a noun relates on the one hand to the subject of the act; it belongs to the subject rather than to the act. (It cannot be identified with the subject, though, as we shall see later.) On the other hand, this consciousness is not only a consciousness *of* the subject, but simultaneously a consciousness of the (conscious) act. The theme of the following

¹². This distinction is at stake whenever someone distinguishes between action (*Handlung. Tat,*, etc.) and other free acts such as speaking, thinking, free inner attitudes, etc. Scheler, Hildebrand, Pfaender, Seifert and other phenomenological authors use “action” (*Handlung*) in the narrower sense of the term.

¹³. See note 12.

¹⁴. This term has, as far as I can tell, been coined by D. von Hildebrand. Other terms have been coined by different authors in order to refer to the same *datum*. See the report on this in J. Seifert's essay quoted in note 8.

considerations is this consciousness of (conscious) acting rather than the immanent predicate “conscious” which belongs to the act as such.

Consciousness in this (noun-related) sense reflects both the person and his conscious acts; it also “fashions” them. The (self-) conscious subject gets acquainted with his own acts and his consciousness; in some way he “reflects” his acts prior to any explicit act of reflection or self-knowledge. When we think for example of a person who acts “in good conscience” or “in bad conscience,” we clearly find a “reflective” element which is prior to any outspoken reflection upon our acts or to any act of self-knowledge which may occur only much later.

Wojtyła notes that the exploration of the aspect of consciousness of human acting is enormously important and yet has been rather neglected in the traditional treatment of the human acting:

Let us note, however, that although in the traditional conception of human act this aspect was not entirely disregarded, its presentation was vague, and, as it were, only implied in it. (30)

In the traditional definition of the *actus humanus* as *rationalis* and as *voluntarius* (rational and voluntary) the aspect of consciousness was implied but not exhibited. To unfold this aspect of consciousness is precisely the task which the author of *The Acting Person* hopes to carry out.

A second basic observation which concerns consciousness in the substantial sense is that the agent possesses a consciousness of both the fact that he is *acting* and that it is *he who* is acting. This dual aspect of consciousness in which the person becomes aware of the dynamic relationship between act and person is later developed further in the context of distinguishing the *reflective* (mirroring) function of consciousness from the *reflexive* function of consciousness. A first and partly inaccurate attempt of ours to describe the *reflexive* (second) function of consciousness leads to the following formulation: when we are conscious that we are acting it is not as if the *subject as possessing* consciousness would only “look at” something distinct from himself and see that “it” or “he” possesses consciousness. Rather, it seems as if there is not only the *reflective* turn of consciousness over our action and ourselves as the action's subject; there is also a further *reflexive* turn in which the unity and identity of the subject insofar as he possesses consciousness of himself as acting and insofar as he acts consciously is realized. This latter step seems to be implied in the reflexive function of consciousness in which the agent knows that it is he who acts.

Another significant observation of the book which sheds light on the distinction between the adjectival and substantive sense of consciousness is expressed in the remark that consciousness (noun) has three relations to the conscious act (action): it accompanies the conscious action (in reflecting it while it is being performed); it precedes it (in the form of self-consciousness of the subject who acts, but perhaps also in form of the consciousness of the action which is implied in intending and planning the action prior to performing it); finally, consciousness succeeds it. (Perhaps memory of the action is referred to here, perhaps also a reflection of an action in consciousness after the action has happened but prior to any explicit recalling of it.)

In light of these three relations of consciousness to conscious acting, especially in light of the first and third one, it can be noticed clearly that consciousness in the substantial sense is radically different from consciousness as an immanent moment of acting. For the identity and continuity of consciousness in the “substantial” sense reaches much farther than that of “adjectival” consciousness which is intrinsic and immanent to a conscious activity and which “lives” only as long as the act itself *which* is conscious. “Consciousness” however reflects the action when it is conceived, when it is being performed, and afterwards.

It is by no means denied by Wojtyła that cognitive conscious acts are intentionally directed towards objects which stand over against us, as many phenomenologists, following Husserl and Brentano, frequently noticed and elaborated on. But can intentionality in the sense of a directedness towards objects which stand over against us also be attributed to consciousness in the substantial sense? It seems clear, as Wojtyła notes, that this is not the case. It is clearly given that consciousness in the substantial sense does not have the conscious acting “over against itself” as an intentional object *of* which we are conscious. Hence Wojtyła quite rightly puts into question the thesis defended by most phenomenologists that *all* consciousness is intentionally directed towards objects. At the same time, consciousness in the substantial sense has some sort of “cognitive function” and implies a

getting acquainted with our conscious acts *as if* they were objects of our consciousness, without them, however, being actually objects over against our consciousness. In view of this result, another important point seems to emerge clearly, which is not expressly stated in *The Acting Person*.

Consciousness in the noun-sense *never* seems to be intentionally directed to acts as objects although it seems to possess an analogous distance to that “of which” it is conscious (subject, conscious actions) which reminds us vaguely of the subject-object-situation characteristic of intentional acts. In virtue of this “distance” it is decisively different from the attributive sense of “conscious” which is applicable to all acts of knowing, willing, feeling, and so forth. There we do not find this distance between the attribute “conscious” and the act which is conscious; there we find in the most radical mode what von Hildebrand has called *Vollzugsbewußtsein*, i.e., a conscious performing of an act; the reason why the act is conscious is that it is a conscious entity, not that another conscious act would be directed *at* our act as its object. This latter idea is suggested by the unfortunate term “internal perception” or “secondary perception” which in some authors (e.g., Brentano) evokes a misleading impression as if we were constant onlookers of our own acts and as if to *live* them consciously would be the same as to be conscious *of* them as objects of a “secondary” perception directed at them.¹⁵

Nevertheless, while the immanent conscious performance of acts does not involve any distance between act and consciousness, this dimension of consciousness alone allows for the distance between the act and the object which stands over against the act and to which we are directed consciously and intentionally. Thus the same conscious act which is consciously directed to an object and possesses a distance to it, lacks any such distance to itself; and yet it is a conscious entity in itself and acquaints us with itself in a most intimate interior fashion.

Insofar as consciousness in the substantival sense implies the described reflective element and mirrors what goes on in the conscious subject, it is also described as exerting a “penetrative illumination” and as keeping the conscious acts “in the light of consciousness,” to speak figuratively. If all there existed were the conscious acts of man with their immanent conscious character, they would, as soon as they belonged to the past, disappear from consciousness altogether. Thus, insofar as consciousness in the substantival sense seems to embody within itself also the function of continuity, insofar as it succeeds conscious actions, it seems to exert the function of the Augustinian *memoria*: it keeps conscious acts in the light of consciousness. But there is more to this function. Some implicit understanding and judgment on our conscious experiences seems to take place through the way in which the latter appear in consciousness in the substantival sense. It is as if they were kept in consciousness according to “their true nature.”

Although this element of “truth” in the way in which consciousness retains conscious acts and implies a knowledge of them, is still quite implicit and not yet a self-knowledge proper, it suffices to justify Wojtyła's statement that conscious acts are kept in the light of consciousness due to the mirroring function of consciousness.

Another decisive observation of the author, however, is the following: “consciousness” is not a separate entity nor is it simply identical with the person as subject. Rather, it is in a sense the “content”, or perhaps we should say the “awakened state,” of the person. This being the case, it differs from any faculty or any other independent factor in the person. While it is not simply identical with the person (in being the person's awakened state), it is also not different from the person in the manner in which single faculties or acts are different from the person.

¹⁵. This view was definitely inherent in Brentano's thesis that each conscious act has a two-fold object, an intentional object outside itself and itself as a “secondary object.” I think that this misleading analysis of consciousness according to which each conscious contact with our own being occurs only by means of some objectivation of our being, influenced the later Husserl and many other phenomenologists including Strasser. They were led to an idealist position on consciousness partly because they thought the ultimate subject of consciousness remains transcendental (transcendent) to our experience because any conscious contact with it implies some objectivation which falls to bring us into contact with what the ego really is “in itself.” In Kant this view led to his thesis that all proofs for the existence of the soul are due to a paralogism of pure reason according to which the ego-subject and the ego-object are wrongly identified. I referred elsewhere to the far-reaching consequences of this view and offered a criticism of them. See J. Seifert, *Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit. Die Transzendenz des Menschen in der Erkenntnis*. (Salzburg, 1972), 2nd Part; and the passages referred to in note 4, above.

In regard to the mirroring and illuminating function, consciousness seems to be very close to what Augustine in *De Trinitate* describes as *nosse seipsum*. (This *nosse seipsum* as a sort of prereflective knowing oneself is contrasted by him with the *cogitare seipsum*, i.e., a cognition and thinking of oneself in which one becomes the object of one's thought and stands, as it were, over against one's own thinking.)¹⁶ Wojtyła, too, recognizes that consciousness gives a faithful image and reflection of the person prior to objectivation and prior to a situation in which we are objects of our own acts. He writes:

The consciousness of an action is a reflection, one of the many mirrorings, which make up the consciousness of the person. This reflection belongs by its very nature to consciousness and does not consist in the objectivation of either the action or the person, even though it carries within itself a faithful image of the action as well as of the person. (34)

The question arises whether there are not, as Nietzsche's and Scheler's investigations into *Ressentiment* suggest, forms of "organic mendacity," or types of "unconsciousness," "blindness" or "blurred conscience" which reduce or jeopardise the "faithfulness" of the "image" of our acts in consciousness.

Self-Knowledge, Self-Deception and Consciousness

The mirroring function of consciousness contains already some rudimentary cognitive element prior to any explicit cognitive comprehension. Such an explicit cognitive comprehension is achieved in self-knowledge which is very different from the reflective function of consciousness.

In acts of self-knowledge the person becomes the object of his own knowledge; an objectivation occurs which is precisely absent in consciousness as such, even in its reflective function. Self-knowledge is also of a greater clarity when compared to the kind of implicit "knowledge" (*nosse*) found in consciousness. (One is very much reminded of a similar thought expressed by Augustine in the famous passage, *Tanta est enim cogitationis vis*.)¹⁷

It seems that the author holds that consciousness itself contains some "reflective element," and that this "reflection" of our conscious actions is infallible, or *prior to the possibility of error*. On the level of the "objectivizing" reflection, however, errors and self-deceptions can take the place of genuine self-knowledge. Thus the new clarity and conceptual explicitness with which our own being is grasped in self-knowledge is acquired at the price of the possibility of deviation of the contents of our acts of reflection from the reality of our being. If such a "deviation" besets reflection, a conflict occurs between what our

¹⁶. This distinction is made in many passages in *De Trinitate*. VII-XV. See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XIV, vi, 8. "But so great is the power of thought that not even the mind itself may place itself, so to speak, in its own sight, except when it thinks of itself. And consequently nothing is so in the sight of the mind, except when one thinks of it, that not even the mind itself, by which is thought whatever is thought, can be in its own sight in any other way than by thinking of itself. But how it is not in its own sight when it does not think of itself, since it can never be without itself, just as though itself were one thing and its sight another thing, I am unable to discover. For it is not absurd to speak thus of the eye of the body, since the eye itself is fixed in its own proper place in the body, but its sight is directed to those things that are without, and reaches even to the stars. Nor is the eye in its own sight, seeing that it does not see itself, except when a mirror is placed before it, as we have already said; and certainly this is not done when the mind places itself in its own sight by thinking of itself.

Or does the mind, then by one part of itself see another part of itself when it sees itself by thinking, as with some of our members, the eyes, we see our other members which can be in our sight? What can be said or thought that is more absurd than this? For by what, therefore, is the mind removed except by itself and where is it placed in its own sight except before itself? Hence, it will not be there where it was when it was not in its own sight, because it is put down in one place after it is withdrawn from another place. But if it has wandered away in order to be seen, where will it remain in order to see? Or is it, as it were, doubled, so that it is both there and here, that is, both where it can see and where it can be seen: in itself in order that it may see, and before itself in order that it may be seen? When the truth is consulted, it does not give any of these answers, since when we think thus, we think only through the feigned images of bodies, and that the mind is not such is absolutely certain to the few minds that can be consulted for the truth about this matter.

It remains, therefore, that its sight is something belonging to its nature, and the mind is recalled to it when it thinks of itself, not as it were by a movement in space, but by an incorporeal conversion; on the other hand, when it does not think of itself, it is indeed not in its own sight, nor is its gaze formed from it; but yet it knows itself, as if it were a remembrance of itself to itself."

¹⁷. See Augustinus, *De Trinitate*. XIV, vi, 8 (See note 16).

consciousness (in its reflective function) tells us about ourselves and what we believe ourselves to be in reflection. Therefore, the equilibrium and inner harmony of the state of soul of a given person depends on, among other things, the degree to which his self-knowledge is adequate and not replaced by errors of self-deception, and hence in harmony with the reflective function of consciousness. The two aspects of “knowing” ourselves diverge and lead to disharmony and restlessness, for example, in bad conscience or in “bad faith.” Such an inner disharmony afflicts each case of a contradiction between what we know ourselves to be in a prereflective manner through the “reflective function” of consciousness (which is not yet reflection proper), and between what we try to persuade ourselves to be on the level of explicit reflection. For whereas in true self-knowledge the contents of consciousness open themselves up to the person as a result of his rational cognitive penetration of his own being, in self-deception the contents of consciousness which reflect our conscious acting are not allowed to enter the field of self-knowledge. They are suppressed and replaced by distorted visions and “images” of the self.

The results of these investigations in *The Acting Person* throw a completely new light on depth-psychology and on the problem of the unconscious. For they show that one of the most decisive forms of the unconscious is not a total absence of conscious acting and motivation, or their complete expulsion from the sphere of consciousness (not even from the grasp of the “reflective” function of consciousness), but rather an absence of self-knowledge coupled with self-deceptions which push contents outside the sphere of self-knowledge or rather keep them from entering it.

Self-knowledge has as its object both the person and his action. This twofold object of self-knowledge accounts for two very different dimensions of self-knowledge and, at the same time, corresponds to two different dimensions of consciousness itself: the consciousness of ourselves as subjects and the consciousness of our conscious acting.

In his highly original analysis of the relation between self-knowledge and consciousness Wojtyła also points out that self-knowledge does not simply follow on the reflective function of consciousness. It does not itself remain completely outside the sphere of the reflective function of consciousness. It is certainly correct to express an act of self-knowledge in the following words: “Only now I became conscious of what I have done,” which shows that self-knowledge constitutes a higher mode of self-consciousness; it extends as it were the lines of the reflecting function of consciousness into the domain of intentional cognition where we become the thematic object of our own acts of knowing. Moreover, the content and act of self-knowledge is itself reflected in consciousness in such a way that a person's consciousness becomes modified as soon as he possesses self-knowledge. The self-knowledge in which we grasp, for example, that our acts were good or evil becomes itself a content which is reflected in consciousness.

In light of this fact the critical question poses itself again whether the reflective function of consciousness contains necessarily a perfectly faithful “image” of what goes on in the conscious life of the person. It seems at least that errors and deceptions about oneself, insofar as *they* are reflected in consciousness, are not reflected there as clearly and as much according to their true nature, as genuine self-knowledge. It also seems that the original conscious acts are, under the influence of general errors or self-deceptions, reflected less accurately in the consciousness of the victim of errors and self-deceptions than in that of the person who possesses authentic self-knowledge. A certain pre-reflective “lie of consciousness” is possible; at least there are different degrees of clarity and faithfulness in the reflective function of consciousness itself such that some persons may have to dig into deeper recesses of their “reflective consciousness” in order to reach there “the faithful reflection of themselves,” which may indeed exist on *some* level in each person. Our question arises also from a consideration of the possibility of a distorted and blinded moral conscience in which some impurity of the reflective function of consciousness seems undeniable.

Acts of self-knowledge by no means have a general abstract object. Rather, it is always and exclusively the unique and individual ego which is the object of self-knowledge (40). This puts into question the traditional thesis that the proper object of the intellect are (only) universals, not particulars. It is certainly the case that in self-knowledge we use general knowledge and general concepts, but self-knowledge as such refers to the individual and stops there. Moreover, while it draws on the general knowledge of man, the general knowledge of man also draws on it. The generalizations at which self-knowledge too aims refer to the

general character of the *individual* man rather than to the knowledge of the universal nature of man. (40-41)

Self-knowledge ought also never to be understood as a neutral knowledge of what factually goes on in us; it is self-knowledge in the authentic sense only if it is a knowledge in light of values, especially in light of moral values. This point too is of crucial importance, particularly in the critical examination of depth-psychology. It is not further unfolded in the book. (A profound critique of depth-psychology in light of this truth has been carried out in *Transformation in Christ* by D. von Hildebrand in the chapters on self-knowledge and “true consciousness.” Many of the points of this critique are independent from the strictly religious context of the book.)

The Two Functions of Consciousness

So far we have dealt with consciousness in the substantival sense only under the aspect of its first function which is also called by Wojtyla the “objectivizing function.” It owes this designation to the fact that it exercises some knowledge of and about our conscious acts, yet it lacks real objectivation which occurs only in reflection proper and in self knowledge. There alone do our conscious acts become objects of our own cognitive penetration.

The first, “objectivizing” or “reflective,” function of consciousness is also called the mirroring function. But this “mirroring” is by no means understood in simple analogy to the mirror-phenomenon in the physical world, an analogy which is used in a more literal sense by the mirror-theory of knowledge in Lenin and Marxism. The spiritual quality of the “mirroring” of consciousness, in virtue of which it utterly differs from any material mirror-phenomenon, is specifically thrown into relief by Wojtyla when he insists that this first function of consciousness achieves also some permeating and illuminating of what is mirrored (41).

A second and profoundly different role of consciousness — the latter being taken always in the substantival sense — is called “the subjectivation of consciousness.” Consciousness has a radically different role from the quasi-objectivation and “quasi-cognition” of our conscious acts (actions) and of their relation to the ego. Consciousness has also the task of letting us experience these acts and actions “*from within*” as our own actions. While they are a fully “objective” reality, they are given to the subject not only “from without” in some fashion as that of which the subject is aware, but they are also consciously experienced “from within” as our very own conscious being and acting. (This is also called by the author “the subjectivization of the objective.”) Consciousness in its reflexive function is the *inner givenness* of our acts as our own.

What does this “subjectivation of consciousness,” this second function of consciousness entail? It is in a sense the opposite of objectivation and of the prefiguration of knowledge *about* ourselves which we found in the first, the reflective function of consciousness. What we encounter in the second role of consciousness is rather an experience of our being and of our own acts in a completely interior, “distance-less” oneness with them, or perhaps a conscious “living of” our being and acts *from within and as our own*. The inner givenness of our own being as our own prior to any reflection, to any act of turning our own mind upon ourselves, is the “inner side” of consciousness which Wojtyla refers to as to the second function of consciousness. (This second function of consciousness comes perhaps closest to Hildebrand's notion of *Vollzugsbewusstsein*.)

We touch here a point of decisive significance for the understanding of man's conscious being, namely that our conscious contact with our being does not necessarily entail any distance between ourselves as subjects who look and ourselves as objects upon whom we look. In German Idealism precisely this interiority-dimension of consciousness is overlooked and it is suggested, for example by Kant and Fichte, that the conscious contact with our being as it is “in itself” is excluded precisely because our being qua subject escapes eternally our experiential and knowing grasp. Exactly this view is shown to be false by the results of Wojtyla's investigations.¹⁸

The inferiority of conscious experience is of course very close to, and merges in a sense with, the inferiority suggested by the attributive sense of consciousness which was

¹⁸. See note 15.

discussed above. The immanent quality of consciousness which allows us to call our acts conscious entities is perhaps only an aspect of the conscious lived experience of our own acts “from within,” as our own. Yet Cardinal Wojtyła probably not only wants to emphasize, in addition to the immanent consciousness of acts, the interior *self*-consciousness, the conscious living of *our own being as subjects*; in speaking of the reflexive function of consciousness he also seems to refer to an element of “reflexion” or turning back upon ourselves, an element which seems to be alluded to in the very term “reflexive,” especially if one thinks of the analogy to the reflective pronouns. Perhaps this element of “reflexivity” could be contrasted, however, to the more “objective moment” of “reflectivity” found in the first function of consciousness. While this more objective function of consciousness seems to give us preliminary stages of a knowledge *about* ourselves which is in a sense analogous to the knowledge of others, the “*reflexive*” second dimension of consciousness, while it also implies some bending back over our own being and our own acts, seems to consist in a bending back over our own actions as our own actions, over our own being *as our own*. Moreover, this *reflexive* experience of ourselves as *subjects* of our consciousness and of our conscious actions (44) has the “goal” of giving to the ego the heightened experience of his own subjectiveness, of the unspeakable thisness of his own personhood *as given from within*. Whereas no consciously living person can lose the inferiority of the lived inner experience as such, he can lose the heightened existential awareness of himself which is provided by the reflexive function of consciousness. He can look at himself as if he were a neutral object of observation.

Consciousness, Ego, Person, and the Problem of Constitution

In the context of his analysis of consciousness the author makes some profound statements about the problem of constituted being versus a reality prior to constitution. He argues that the ego, in and through the experience and conscious awareness of his being and of his subjectiveness, constitutes himself as *subject*, or better, as *ego* (which does not refer to the substantial reality of our being but to the reality of ourselves *as* conscious agents). Consciousness is no longer viewed as something merely “accidental” to the person; rather:

Consciousness is not just an aspect but also an essential dimension or an actual moment of the reality of the being that I am, since it constitutes its subjectiveness in the experiential sense. This being, which in its antic structure is basically a real individual object, would never without consciousness constitute itself as the ego. It seems that this is how we have to interpret the manner in which consciousness is incorporated into the ontological structure of the being that is man if we are to bring out in the correct proportions his subjectiveness, that is, the subjectiveness that makes of every concrete human being the unique, individual ego. (46)

While this aspect of the ontological constitution of the ego through consciousness refers primarily to the “reflexive function” of consciousness, also the reflective function of consciousness as well as self-knowledge clearly seem to play a part in this constitution (45). Conscious awakening in all its dimensions enters into the (full) constitution of the person *as* a conscious agent, and thus as that being which man is called to be. (To be wholly deprived of consciousness — forever — would for the person almost amount to annihilation; hence consciousness co-constitutes the very actuality and reality of what the person is *as* ego.)

The meaning of Wojtyła's term “constitution” — and this is decisive — does not seem to be the same as Husserl's meaning which refers to *noemata* and aspects (intentional *objects* of consciousness) which originate in the *noesis* (intentional thinking activity). Wojtyła's concept of constitution often comes closer to Hengstenberg's notion of *ontological* constitution. The ego as conscious *subject* is not constituted (transcendentally) as object of consciousness but consciousness is an entity, or better an ontologically constitutive state and actualization of the person. Perhaps Wojtyła's concept of constitution encompasses moments of both concepts of constitution. For the ego is constituted both by consciousness as inherent ontological actuality of the subject (ontological constitution), and by the unique “aspect” and “face” which our own being presents to ourselves when we get acquainted with it “from within,” in consciousness and self-knowledge. In this latter sense the difference between the I-

character and the Thou-character of *objectively the same person* is clearly constituted as a profoundly different aspect or “face” which depends on the given subject’s “viewpoint.”

The legitimate incorporation of notions of constitution and even of “self-constitution” are combined by Wojtyła with the insight of classical metaphysics that consciousness as a “state” (of awakening) must after all in some fashion belong to the categories related to “accidents” in the metaphysical sense, or at least to the realm of metaphysical principles and modes of being which are real only in a subject or substance distinct from them. Actualization of being is not identical with the very being of the person as the subject of actualization (consciousness) and as subject (substance) in the ontological sense. A particularly profound and admirable passage in the book attempts to formulate this intricate ontological state of affairs:

Consciousness, as we view it here, is a specific dimension of that unique real being which is the concrete man. That being is neither overshadowed by nor absorbed in consciousness, albeit this would be the case according to the fundamental tenet of idealistic thought that *esse* equals *percipi*; for idealists maintain that 'to be' is the same as to be constituted by consciousness, and do not recognize any mode of being apart from consciousness and consciousness alone. Our approach to the matter however is the opposite: consciousness in intimate union with the ontologically founded being and acting of the concrete man-person does not absorb in itself or overshadow this being, its dynamic reality, but, on the contrary, discloses it “inwardly” and thereby reveals it in its specific distinctness and unique concreteness. *This disclosing is precisely what the reflexive function of consciousness consists in.* (46)

We find here the elaboration of a double aspect of consciousness. Consciousness constitutes the person as (conscious) *ego* and it “discloses inwardly” the reality of the person which is presupposed objectively in its substantiality for consciousness. Consciousness can only exist as the actual awareness *of* a person, not “in itself” as “pure consciousness” (s758). The elaboration of this double aspect of consciousness is one of the decisive steps of synthesizing insights of Husserl with those of the great tradition and Thomism and of criticizing both Husserl and the tradition in light of the genuine discoveries made by each.

Consciousness of “Man-Acts” and of “Occurrences in Man”

There is a unique experiential difference between the experience of *acting*, in which we are the *agent*, and the experience of being *passive*, of being the subject of something that “merely occurs in us.” The experience of morality is profoundly linked to this difference in experience.

One could immediately raise a few difficult questions which we shall not attempt to answer at this point: Is this a complete alternative? Are there not experiences and acts of which the person is not a *free* agent (such as knowledge or the *Wertfühlen*, i.e., an appreciative emotion by which according to both Scheler and Wojtyła values are perceived, 48)? Are such acts of knowledge or feeling not also specifically human and opposed to what merely happens in us (49)?

Wojtyła clearly recognizes that the experience of free acting is intimately connected with man’s emotional life (50-52). He develops in this context many reflections about the interrelation between freedom and emotion which resemble very much those of other phenomenologists on this topic, for example, some sections of Scheler’s *Formalism* and the analysis of the intimate link between freedom and affectivity in Hildebrand’s discussion of “cooperative” and of “indirect” freedom.¹⁹ Wojtyła’s main thesis in this context is that while emotions belong to the genuinely spiritual sphere in man (52) and are thus undeserving of the contempt in which they have been held by many philosophers in the past, there is a specifically emotive dynamism in man which may exert an undue influence over our actions. This may occur in different ways in what is called by the author “emotionalization of consciousness.” Man can be swayed by feelings (as) and the ego as center of consciousness may, under their impact, recede into the background; even the mirror-function of consciousness may be

¹⁹. See D. von Hildebrand, *Ethics*, 2nd edition (Chicago, 1972), p. 316 ff., 338 ff.

weakened although it can never wholly disappear. Whenever the true personal ego is not brought out as the pivot of experience, whenever the free personal center is no longer present and active in our emotional life, feelings play an illegitimate role of “emotionalizing consciousness.” On the other hand, so we could continue the summary of the author’s thought, feelings are in many of their forms spiritual; they are decisive components of human life and ought to be integrated into man’s experience. This genuine integration of our affective life can only be achieved through the cooperation of our free will (52, 56).

The author returns to the decisive role of consciousness for human acting. The dynamism and the specific efficacy of human acting, he tells us, are not only realized in the field of consciousness, they are not only mirrored by consciousness; they are also pervaded by consciousness, are conscious realities in themselves.

Act and Acting: Efficacy as Specifically Personal and Free

In the experience of “I act” we ourselves are placed “inside” the very content of experience. Whereas not every aspect of human dynamisms requires consciousness and often is not even reflected in consciousness (such as bodily processes, 60), acting in the specifically *human* sense of the term is both essentially conscious and reflected in consciousness. And here we encounter a first clear distinction between the experience “I act” (in such a human, free manner) and “something happens in me.” In a sense we are faced here with two opposite directions of experience (61-62). Certainly, the experience of “something-happens-*in*-man” is also clearly different from “something happens with man” or “to man” (from without). “Something-happens-*in*-man” refers to an inner passive dynamism in man; man suffers something.

In the traditional (Aristotelian-Thomistic) approach this difference in man between action and passion (affection) has been interpreted in analogy to a similar difference which exists in all beings, the potency-act difference. This Aristotelian distinction is briefly expounded by Wojtyła; act and potency are mutually correlative; neither of them (least of all potency) is fully intelligible without the other. Actualization is the movement from potency to act as to the superior mode of being; it is a becoming, and yet not an emergence of being from nothing. Actualization is “to become what one already (potentially) is.” Potency and act are two modes of being, but act is the fulfillment of the meaning of being.

Without denying that general metaphysics is the soil for all knowledge and understanding, the author of *The Acting Person* turns away from an interpretation of human acting as merely one kind of actualization in general. Rather, he concentrates primarily on what is specific to the person, on the difference between an *actus hominis* in the sense of a mere impersonal actualization of man, and the *actus humanus*, the specifically human and personal mode of acting.

It is not quite clear to the reviewer whether the experience of “something-happens-*in*-man” does not also refer to an “actualization” (in the metaphysical sense) rather than to potency. But certainly, specifically human free efficacy is a unique mode of actualization. It is on this unique mode of actualization that Wojtyła concentrates because only such a concentration on the experienced datum of the action can lead us really to the metaphysics of the person, the most interesting “thing in itself.” Such a concentration on the specific mode of being of the person’s acting — this thesis seems to be implied by the author — has not been carried out sufficiently by the philosophers who in the past interpreted man in terms of the potency-act-duality.

Wojtyła holds that the “moment of efficacy” is the distinguishing mark of human acting qua personal acting. This is surprising at first because the term efficacy does not seem to indicate the specifically personal moment of freedom but mere causality which is also found outside of the person (e.g., the efficacy of a waterfall). Moreover, the specifically human character of actions goes back to a general dimension of rationality and spirituality which is not only found in free acts (efficacy) but also manifested in acts of knowledge which do not exert efficacy. Wojtyła would reply to the latter point that human acting is not synonymous with human act. While not denying the specifically personal character of human knowledge, the book’s emphasis lies only on that which is both *specifically active and personal* in man. Also the first reason for surprise is easily removed when one keeps in mind that “efficacy” is

used by Wojtyła as a *terminus technicus* and stands precisely for the specifically personal moment of acting in the *actus humanus*.

The moment of efficacy is given in the “experience of being the actor.” (66). Moreover, this experience of being the actor of my act involves also the experience of having *responsibility* for a particular actualization of myself as subject. With the experience of responsibility we have of course also the experience of *freedom*. All of these are moments in the experience of (specifically personal) efficacy.

The experience of being free and responsible involves not only the experience of us being the cause of our own acts (such an experience could also be had by an animal in some manner). Rather, as the author puts it brilliantly (reminding the reviewer of some similar observations on freedom in Bonaventure), we experience ourselves as *being the conscious cause of our own causation* (66). What does this mean? It means that we are not only the cause but an “absolute” origin of an act, that we are truly “at the origin” or “the origin” of the (free) action. (We cannot enter a discussion here of how this truth is compatible with the contingency of our being and acting.) Freedom involves an “efficient causality” of a unique kind which makes our acts *properties* of ourselves as efficacious subjects (67-68).

Being the culmination of human dynamism, free acts are also *creative* in a unique form (69-70). This creativity is understood here not only in reference to the outward products of human making but also and primarily in regard to the relation in virtue of which we bring forth inwardly and freely our own acts (70).

The same man experiences himself as agent and as the subject of what happens in and to him. In fact, these two aspects of our experience are so closely tied together that in being free agents we simultaneously create ourselves and are created by ourselves, etc.

In the phenomenological analysis of the data surrounding consciousness and freedom, however, the question of the ultimate ontological foundation of acting ought not to be bypassed. We find that all acting presupposes the *real existence* of the agent. Existence lies at the origin of everything that is in man in terms both of his acting and of what happens in him. Coming into being is the “first act” of every being and only because he is a being can man become the subject of existence and acting.²⁰ This strict relationship between acting and existing allows us to subscribe to the traditional principle, “for something to act, it must first exist” (73). Nevertheless, action is also an “enactment of existence.”

Yet, the ontological foundation of the man-person cannot be sought only in existence but is also found, in accordance with Boethius, in the fact that man is an *individua substantia* of “rational nature” (73). This classical definition should however never lead us to overlook the abyss which yawns between an “individual substance” in the sense of “something,” and an individual substance in the sense of “someone.”²¹ The character of being “someone” (74, 75) can only be sufficiently thrown into relief by also considering the question of the relation between person and nature.

Nature has many meanings; it can denote that which belongs to a being “from birth” (*nasci-nature*); it can refer to the material world only; it can have an “attributively delimited” meaning such as in expressions like “the nature of the animal,” or “human nature.” The term “nature” can likewise designate “essence.” It can however also refer to “the manner of acting open to (the subject of acting).” (77)

²⁰. The decisive philosophical contributions of St. Thomas Aquinas concerning the role of existence (*esse*) as “act of being” have been brought to the attention of contemporary thinkers by many Thomists, especially by E. Gilson and his school of “existential Thomism.” In part independently from the contemporary Thomistic interest in the actuality of “existing,” in part under the influence of contemporary Thomism, several phenomenologists (I. Hering, R. Ingarden, E. Stein, H. Conrad-Martins, J. Seifert) have submitted extensive studies on the essence-existence problematic.

²¹. Wojtyła is one of those contemporary philosophers who emphasize that metaphysics insofar as it studies being qua being not only in the most general universal sense but in the sense of “that which possesses being in the most authentic sense,” cannot culminate in the philosophy of substance as such. Rather, a completely new and a much deeper sense of being is encountered in the person. With other contemporary philosophers and metaphysicians he considers the metaphysics of man qua man, of the person qua person, as a decisive task for the metaphysician. The being of the person qua person can also not be simply derived from the notion of substance by adding “rational” to substance. The difference *within* substance between persons and non-persons is more decisive for the understanding of being than any differentiation between the different categories of being as such. Without being able to develop this thesis further at this point, I should like to stress the fact that Wojtyła’s work is an important metaphysical contribution, not only a contribution towards philosophical anthropology. The first section of the book on consciousness and the introduction on the method of philosophy and experience belong also to epistemology, the area of philosophy to which this volume of *Aletheia* is dedicated.

Nature in this last sense involves and reveals the dynamism of the subject, an activeness which is contained in the “dynamic readiness” of the subject. The author's clear understanding of the difference and in a sense opposition between the person as conscious agent, as freely causing acts, on the one hand, and “nature,” on the other hand, is combined with the clear perception of the need for their “integration;” such an integration leads to a mutual interpenetration of nature and free personal acting in one and the same human subject:

Acting and happening are both human insofar as they derive within the person from nature, from the humanness of man. It is the person itself that is human and so are its actions. The efficacy of the human ego pertaining to action reveals the transcendence of the person, without, however, separating the person from nature. (84)

However, the fact of the integration between person (freedom) and nature does in no way abolish their difference, neither the difference between what simply flows from nature and that which is due to specific personal free “efficacy,” nor between what only happens in man and his acting (85).

In fact, the very purpose of the book is to show the unique dimension of the being of the person which is not actualized simply by those actualizations which flow from man's nature, but only by those which are due to freedom and self-determination.

After an analysis of the various dimensions of potentiality, activity and passivity, and after a discussion of the relation between consciousness, psychoemotive potentiality, somato-vegetative potentiality, and subconsciousness, Wojtyła arrives at the following conclusion which underlines once again the central significance of consciousness and freedom for the understanding of the person:

“continuity and cohesion exist within the frame of the subconscious, they also span the gap between subconsciousness and consciousness. The threshold of consciousness” (censorship in Freud's, and the author's wider sense of the term) “not only divides the one from the other but it also connects them with each other ...” (95)

“There is something highly significant in the constant drive toward the light of consciousness, in the constant urge emanating from the subconscious to attain the level of consciousness and to be consciously experienced. Hence both the existence of subconsciousness and the functions it performs indubitably indicate that unconsciousness is the sphere where man most appropriately fulfills himself.” (95)

Turning back to the question of the actualization of the person (the being-acting-becoming relation) the author remarks once again that the first and most fundamental level of the actualization and dynamization of the being that is the personal subject occurs in the act of existence. The coming into existence is also the first form of becoming. “Nevertheless, in each subsequent dynamization something begins to exist in the man-subject that already is.”

While such coming into existence is in metaphysical terms accidental to him who already exists, still

man changes one way or another with all his actions and with all that happens in him: both these forms of the dynamism proper to him make *something* of him and at the same time they, so to speak, make *somebody* of him. (96, 97)

While also bodily occurrences and changes due to man's age and to other factors constitute an important form of becoming, the really significant mode of actualization and becoming which to understand is central for any metaphysics of the person occurs on the level of action:

It is man's actions, his conscious acting, that make of him *what* and *who* he actually is ... Moral conduct partakes of the reality of human actions as expressing a specific type and line of becoming of the man-subject, the type of becoming that is most intrinsically related to his nature, that is, his humanness, and to the fact of his being a person. (99)

Here, however, freedom is not only a moment; it also forms a real and inherent component of the structure, indeed, a component that is decisive for the entire structure of moral becoming: freedom constitutes the root factor of man's becoming good or bad by his actions; it is the root factor of the becoming as such of human morality. (99)

Thus, the metaphysical understanding of man as person, and of the forms of becoming proper to the person qua person, presupposes a thorough understanding of freedom. This theme is investigated in the second part of the book.

THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE PERSON IN THE ACTION

The experience of freedom and of willing is not reducible to the experience of a mere act, an “I will,” accompanied as it is by the moment of freedom which can be thus formulated: “I will but I need not.”

A deeper “essential” of the person lies behind this experience. Freedom is not only or primarily a property of acts nor a faculty detached from, or accidental to, the person. The person manifests himself in the will, not the will in the person. The will shows itself precisely as a feature *of* the person; hence the very reality of the person becomes manifest in acts of the will. Each act of the will is a concretization of this relation between the acting person and the will. This interrelation reveals itself on closer inspection as a “self-determination of the person.” And this datum of “self-determination” has the greatest existential, moral, and metaphysical relevance.

Self-determination presupposes a special complexity of the person. The person who *has* possession of himself is at the same time his sole and exclusive possession — through freedom. (Wojtyła emphasizes that the fact of a person's belonging to God neither cancels nor overshadows this true manner in which the person, because he is free, is his sole and exclusive possession.) There is a relation of self-ownership (the German *Selbstbesitz*)²² and self-possession which is of the essence of the person and which was already implied in the traditional formulation: *persona est sui juris*.

The moment of self-possession is manifested in every free action. Every “I will” is possible only on the basis of this structural self-possession of the person. Without such a self-possession no self-determination would be possible. Perhaps this fact is overstated when it is said that the person is his “own judge” (106). But the (probably intended) scriptural reference of this passage suggests that there is no exterior factor on which the person depends, that he will not be judged as if his very fate and being did not depend on his very own free self-determination.

The self-possession of the person in freedom has another consequence besides self-determination: self-governance. (The term used in the German translation of another work of the author, *Selbst-Verfügung*, seems to be better chosen.)²³ Without understanding self-governance one can also not understand self-determination.

Self-governance involves a reflexive structure. The person is at the same time the one who governs and the one who is governed (as he is also the one who determines and who is himself determined). Using the term self-governance rather than self-control, the author intends to hint at a far deeper metaphysical essential constitution of the person. Self-governance presupposes self-possession. Self-determination presupposes both (107).

The capacity of self-governance is incommunicable and is one reason for the absolute incommunicability of the person, for the uniqueness that solely a person possesses. Only I myself can govern myself in freedom; this power can never be transferred, abrogated, replaced by anyone distinct from myself (107). Belonging exclusively to the person, it can be regarded as an essential of man qua person; in this sense “will” is also something metaphysically deeper than a “power.” It is a “power” only secondarily; primarily it is an “Essential” (Heidegger's terminology seems to be borrowed here by Wojtyła) of the person. (It should be mentioned that there are many striking similarities between Wojtyła's and St. Bonaventure's metaphysics of freedom and of the person.)

²². This term is used by Jörg Splett in his translation of Karol Cardinal Wojtyła's article, “Person: Subjekt und Gemeinschaft,” in: *Der Streit um den Menschen. Personaler Anspruch des Sittlichen*. (Kvelaer 1979), p. 11-68. This article now has appeared also in English in *The Review of Metaphysics*. Dec. 1979, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, Issue 130.

²³. This term is used in the same translation (see note 22).

Man is not only objectively a person; he is also in a sense an object for himself and — at least in one sense — the primary target of his will and the “immediate object” of his own action. Interpreting this thought of the author, we might add that it is important to distinguish the sense — undoubtedly intended by the text — in which this affirmation is quite accurate and reveals an important fact about the nature of the person, and the false sense in which this statement could easily be misconstrued. Undoubtedly it is true that each person has an immediate power of free determination only over his own person and acts; his very own being and acts alone are immediately determined by himself; in this sense it is quite true to say that each person is the “primary target” of his own will. Yet the statement would be quite false if it were read in such way as to imply that the primary object in the sense of the *theme* or the being to which a free act is consciously directed, is the person of the agent. The *raison d'être*, and in a sense the only true immediate object of, e.g., a free act of love, is the beloved person and not the person who loves (108).

It remains true, however, that in every free act we are faced with a structural “duality.” This can also be expressed by saying that each free act contains an element of “objectivation” inasmuch as the person becomes his own object in some sense. This “objectivation” (which we encountered in another form already in consciousness) belongs to the very essence of the person and of his freedom. Words such as “self-determination” express this fact that the person is both his own subject and object (109).

Nevertheless, it must be stressed again that this objectivation does not imply that we are an intentional object of each free act of ours. To be sure, it is quite possible that we become the object of our own acts of reflection or will and in a sense put ourselves in front of ourselves as intentional object of our own acts. But this precisely does not occur in self-determination. Wojtyła speaks in this context quite aptly and originally of a “ready-made objectiveness of the ego” which is found in this internal structure of self-determination.

This feature of freedom is wholly linked with the fact that a person intentionally wills other things and directs this will at beings distinct from himself. But precisely in this case willing is never a mere proceeding; it is simultaneously a returning and implies that in a sense all other objects of freedom are remote in comparison with the free subject who is determined by each and every free act (109).

Freedom as self-possession, self-governance and self-determination implies also that man forms his ego in one way or another and that he becomes thereby someone or someone else. The will never “happens” in man; it flows from the center of the person and constitutes the very core of his acting.

Here again it becomes clear that acting is understood not only in the sense of the realization of states of affairs which are not yet real or in the sense of freely making things; acting is understood by Wojtyła as every free act, including those which are directed at already existing beings and persons. This becomes especially clear when it is said that every inward act is some form of action and that every action is an external manifestation of the person — even when it is performed wholly inwardly (114-115).

The difference between the will and things that only happen in man is further elucidated by a comparison between the experience of “I will” and that of “I want.” There are at least some forms of wanting something which simply arise from our nature and do not include any moment of self-determination (111). (One could, however, ask the translator of *The Acting Person* whether the “I want” does not often express the “will” — I want to do something — prior to the consummation of the acting; in such cases also the “I want” seems to imply already self-possession and free self-determination. Even when the “I want” does not express a clearly free intention of the will, an I will, it seems often to express a wish which to have or not to have is given within our free power, such as when we say, “I want someone to help this man,” or “I want to kill this man” — although I do not actually will to do either of these things. Wojtyła seems however to refer to those senses of “wanting” which indicate wants or wishes that arise spontaneously in and from our nature without any cooperation of the free center of the person.)

The transcendence of man in action is seen as intimately related to self-governance and self-possession. The possibility of transcendence profoundly characterizes man as a person and without understanding it one cannot ever hope to attain to an adequate metaphysics of the person and to a personalistic ethics. (The ethical implications of transcendence are further unfolded in the author's work, *Amour et Responsabilité*.)

The term “transcendence” indicates a going over and beyond a threshold or boundary. Hence there are many senses of “transcendence” depending on which kind of “going beyond” and on which kind of boundary is at stake. In one sense each act of perception and knowledge implies “transcendence” because the subject reaches out beyond himself and attains the object of his perception and knowledge. This transcendence of man in knowledge, which is termed “horizontal transcendence” by Wojtyła, is found again in radically different forms and senses which I have tried to unfold in my book, *Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit. Die Transzendenz des Menschen in der Erkenntnis*.²⁴

Quite different is what is called in *The Acting Person* “vertical transcendence,” i.e. man's stepping beyond the boundaries of his fixed nature. This transcendence is the fruit of man's self-determination (119).

A close analysis of the text and of the realities it reveals shows that what is here called “vertical transcendence,” while it is always bound to freedom, involves many different dimensions. In order to understand the important insights expressed in the book it might be helpful to unfold in the following these different meanings or dimensions of “vertical transcendence” which are implicit in *The Acting Person*.

Freedom and Transcendence

In order to understand those dimensions of transcendence which involve freedom, some further reflections on the essence of freedom are in order.

1. Formal Transcendence of Freedom

In fact, a first meaning of transcendence (that dimension of vertical transcendence in virtue of which man steps beyond the boundaries of fixed nature) is inseparable from the essence of freedom and is a direct outgrowth of it. In man the ego has a dominant position because man is free. The ego is not just a plaything of the forces of nature, of the milieu or other influences which determine an animal from the outside. The ego is not immersed in all these forces. In virtue of his freedom the ego-person transcends the object, which does not determine his decision; he transcends also his own nature, which cannot determine him.

This indetermination of free acts by anything outside the person, however, is *not* the best way to describe the essence of freedom; for there is no absolute indeterminacy and even less is freedom the same as indeterminacy (as Heisenberg in his philosophical reflections on the uncertainty-relation seems to think). Rather, freedom is auto-determination in which the ego creatively can bring forth and engender free acts (121). The person himself determines the content of his acts.

The free will of the person is not only a property of the person but a power. It is experienced as some power or distinct faculty of the person; thus it is subject to the person and used by him. It is activated by the person in such a way that the person acts through his freedom. Person and freedom are so deeply intertwined that one could say: Because of the person's exclusive power over the will, the will is the power of the person to be free (122).

The person, in being free and in actualizing the auto-determination implied by freedom, transcends, as it were “vertically,” his nature and all other factors from which he is independent; this transcendence is a unique rising of the person above the position “in and between things” which characterizes unfree beings.

²⁴. See note 15. The decisive role of this “horizontal” transcendence” (in the sense of man's reaching truth and reality as they are independently from him, the subject) and its foundational role for the transcendence of man in action (vertical transcendence in various senses) is emphasized by Wojtyła, especially in the article quoted in note 22: “Ohne diese Transzendenz, ohne daß die Person *sich selbst überschreitet* und sozusagen über sich ‘hinauswächst’ *in Richtung* auf die Wahrheit und das *im Lichte der Wahrheit gewollte und gewählte Gute*. ist das personale Subjekt gewissermaßen nicht es selbst.” (33-34).

2. Transcendence as response to the truth and as value response

But while this first dimension of vertical transcendence as a freedom from nature and other factors and as a rising “above” them, is found in each and every free being, and manifests itself in good as well as in evil decisions, there is a second profound sense of “transcendence” in freedom referred to by Wojtyła's term “vertical transcendence.” It is a “*freedom for*” and it contains the very meaning of the transcendence which is grounded formally speaking in autodetermination as such. It is the transcendence free acts have through their relation, especially |through their appropriate relation, to truth and to the good.

The crucial factor in determining the maturity and the perfection of the person is his *consent* to be attracted by positive, authentic Values, his unreserved consent to be drawn in and absorbed by them. (127)

But only if this assent to the motivating power of values is free and implies the moment of free decision, Wojtyła asserts, is it fully *personal*. This freedom of assent and this “decision for the good” are not weakened when the person is absorbed and engulfed by the good, but the decision then becomes only “more fundamental.” Thus freedom is not primarily the choice *between* good and evil but the choice *for* the good, Wojtyła implies, and echoes thereby Anselm of Canterbury's deep criticism of the definition of freedom by the early Augustine according to which freedom consists in the power to choose between good and evil (127). Understood in this way, freedom is in its deepest sense value response (the term was coined by von Hildebrand). Wojtyła writes:

It (decision) comprises not only a passive acceptance or assimilation of a presented value but also an authentic response to the value ...The ability to respond to presented values is will's characteristic trait. In making a decision man always responds to values. (134)

At this point one might ask two questions. First, what is the exact meaning of value here? Is it the same sense of value used by Scheler who calls every kind of positive “importance” of an object, even its mere attractiveness for pleasure, “value”? Or does value have a more distinct meaning, as in von Hildebrand? There, value as an intrinsic preciousness (in itself) of being is distinguished from an importance which makes a being an objective good *for* a person, and from the importance of the merely subjectively satisfying.²⁵ The second question is whether it would not be better to say that the person responds to goods, i.e. to beings which are of value and which are “unified” by their inherent intrinsic importance (value).

However these questions should be answered (and their answer seems of far-reaching consequence to me), it is clear that the whole thrust of Wojtyła's argument aims at value in the latter and stricter sense and that the real transcendence of man in freedom cannot be severed from the response to the good in the sense of a being which is intrinsically precious. In our ensuing report on the ethical contributions of the Cracovian school it shall become clearer that this is the correct interpretation.

A second important moment for the understanding of the transcendence of man in free action is *truth*. If the goods responded to were illusory the transcendence of the free value response to an illusory good would be undermined. While the will is not itself an act of cognition, “it refers in a specific manner (to), however, and is internally dependent on, the recognition of truth.” (137)

Of course many human decisions are based on lies and deceptions; nevertheless, the “will to truth” constitutes the “inner principle of volition” (137). I interpret this statement as the formulation of a goal towards which the will ought to be directed. Although this statement, when it is read literally, seems to speak of any and every volition, the clear meaning of Wojtyła's text is only that “every *authentic* choice of decision making” responds to the “moment of truth,” and is directed towards the truth (138).

The “will to truth” as the “inner principle of volition” is linked to the transcendence of freedom over nature and mere natural causality. For ultimately the independence of the person from his own nature and from other heteronomous determinations could not really occur

²⁵ The elaboration of this distinction constitutes one of the chief contributions D. von Hildebrand made in his ethical work. See his *Ethics*. ch. i-iii; xvii-xviii.

without the person's rationality. This rationality presupposes however the person's relation to truth and reality. This relation to truth in turn becomes full transcendence or grounds authentic transcendence only when the person does not act against truth or in indifference towards it. The person transcends himself really only when he conforms himself freely to the true good.

While it is said in *The Acting Person* that both good and evil acts give witness to *the* principle of decision, choice and action, namely the relation of the will to the truth (139), it is still clear that only in the good action, which is based on the *will to truth*, the authentic transcendence of man in freedom is found. In the evil action, while it does not fail to manifest the transcendence of man which results from his being "compelled" to decide *in the presence* of truth either for or against it, we still are faced with an antithesis to the real transcendence of the good action. The evil man alienates himself from truth and reality, he does not care for it and fails to give the response due to the good. The notion of "due response" plays a key role in Wojtyła's work. He analyzes admirably (152-170) the relation of freedom to the true, the good and the beautiful, as well as the fact that human autonomy finds its limit in the objectivity of truth and value; conscience, responsibility, fulfillment and non-fulfillment of the person can only be understood in light of man's relation to truth and value.

In these truly existential analyses the Heideggerian attempt to sever the phenomena of conscience and care from value and good is successfully overcome. Man is again seen as essentially and existentially involved in the great drama between good and evil, between conscience and the inclinations to do evil. Responsibility is related to the person's ability to respond adequately to truth and value.

The important thing in human striving is its truthfulness — the striving must correspond to the true value of its object. For instance, when a person's action has as its object another person, the directing to the object must correspond to the value of the person. We have here the obligation to refer to the object in accordance with its true value. (171)

3. Transcendence, responsibility of the person and critique of Scholastic views on the good and its relation to appetitus.

Responsibility is above all the responsibility for ourselves, for our own goodness or evilness, adequacy or inadequacy to reality, in light of the axiological question. Against Kant, moral obligation is understood as flowing from the value of beings and thus as having a rational foundation and as leading to a "*rationale obsequium*." The transcendence of man in freedom unfolds itself fully only in the moral sphere, where the ought derives from the "is" of value-bearing reality which ought to be responded to (166-167), where conscience and responsibility, the drama of good and evil, and the ultimate self-shaping of the person as good and evil occur.

It is this grandiose vision of transcendence as a free relation to beings endowed with value (a relation in which beings are affirmed because of their inherent goodness) that motivates Wojtyła's critical remarks about the scholastic doctrine that the will is a "rational appetite."

The thesis that the will is an *appetitus* seems to ignore the fact that the person can transcend nature in both discussed senses of "transcendence." For all *appetitus* seems essentially to be some immanent striving which simply proceeds from the inner principles of a nature and which only "happens" in man (and thus *appetitus* is the opposite of free self-determination). In addition, *appetitus* seems necessarily to lack the transcendence which is found in those acts of the will in which the person conforms himself to a good "*propter ipsum* (for its own sake)". The recognition of man's call to give a free value response (124-125; 128), then, is the second reason why Wojtyła thinks that the notion that the will is a rational *appetitus* ought to be given up.

4. Transcendence and the person to whom man is responsible.

Another basic dimension of the transcendence of man comes to the fore when one considers responsibility *to* a person. It is argued by Wojtyła that the person of the moral agent is not only responsible but is also the one who (in conscience) is like a judge *to* whom he is responsible (173). This is not to deny that there is also a transcendent referent to whom man is

responsible. One could wonder here whether the “to-reference” of responsibility is not always and essentially to *another* person but Wojtyła seems to think that Kant saw a deep truth when he claimed that the autonomy of the moral subject calls — at least also (albeit not exclusively as Kant held) — for a responsibility to oneself (173).

5. Transcendence as the “shape of human life itself.”

Each of these senses of transcendence of man in action could be further differentiated and has of course to be distinguished from the transcendence of the so-called “transcendental properties of being” and the transcendence of man in knowledge (179-180).

The decisive point, however, is that the transcendence of man in action is that moment which concerns the center of man's life: “This shape, the shape of transcendence ... is the shape of human life itself.” (181)

Since this is so, it is true both that self-fulfillment and happiness cannot be viewed as the ultimate motivating goal which constitutes the reason for morally good acts (see more on this below), and that felicity and self-fulfillment are still inseparable from transcendence. Felicity (happiness) is not any mere pleasure, be it ever so deep and spiritual. Rather, the “irreducibility” of felicity and its distinction from pleasure emerges when one sees felicity as strictly related to the transcendence of the person (178), and as consequence of this transcendence.

INTEGRATION OF THE PERSON IN THE ACTION

The third part of the book treats *the integration of the person in the action*. This topic of “integration” leads us to another key-theme of Wojtyła’s philosophy.

Integration and the Soma

Freedom, self-governance, self-determination and self-possession as well as transcendence belong to the essence of man as a person. All these marks distinguish the person from the animal or any other being which is determined or “lived” by its nature.

But man is not only a free person. There are many dynamisms and tendencies in him which are distinct from his freedom and which do not originate in it. Everything that merely happens in man is distinct from the specific personal dynamism which unfolds itself in free action (189).

Of course, here as elsewhere, we have to avoid a misunderstanding as if the personal character of acts were only found in free action; many acts of knowledge and understanding, and many spiritual feelings are quite personal and even spiritual, and yet they are not free. Thus in a sense they belong to “what merely happens in man,” although it ought not to be forgotten that Wojtyła seems to have in mind primarily impersonal and active dynamisms when he uses this expression.

“Integration” of the person is a complementary notion to “transcendence” and it is stated in *The Acting Person* that without integration even transcendence would remain in a “structural void.” What then is this integration?

Integration refers to a “gathering into unity” of diverse dimensions of the person's life (190). Integration brings into unity activity and passivity in the person; governing and being governed; man-acts and “what happens in man,” the experience of efficacy and of “subjectiveness,” etc.

The term “integrity” comes from the Latin “*integer*” which means whole, unimpaired. To integrate then means to assemble component parts so as to make them “whole” or so as to bring them into a higher inner unity. Integration can mean both a process and its result (191).

It is called for either when we are faced with a mere complexity of more or less disconnected elements which ought to be brought into an inner or higher unity; or when we are

confronted with the contrary opposite of unity, with disunity, with disintegrated components which stand in need to be freed or “redeemed” from their state of disunity. Hence there are two basic forms of disintegration which are opposed to integration. When we have the first sense of “disintegration” in mind we can speak of a “disintegration” of man whenever man falls short of the ideal of the “normal man.” The term “normal” of course does not refer here (192) to a mere statistical standard but to an “ideal” one. The second sense of “disunity” is applicable to more drastic cases of “abnormality” or loss of inner unity and peace which manifest themselves as outspoken antitheses to unimpairedness and wholeness. Without pursuing the discussion of this distinction any further, it is clear that there are radically different kinds and symptoms of disintegration.

Even when we restrict ourselves to a medical sense of “disintegration,” we find ourselves confronted with many kinds and symptoms of it. The concern of the author is however not a physical or purely medical sense of bodily disintegration (such as the missing of a limb, etc.) but rather disintegration (in the medical or extra-medical sense) insofar as it refers to the essence of man's personhood and freedom. A philosophical *anthropological* sense of integration and disintegration constitutes the center of Wojtyła's interest.

Therefore he approaches the topic of disintegration from the point of view of his distinctions concerning the freedom of the person as it unfolds itself in self-governance, self-possession, and transcendence. Disintegration is found in any falling short of this structure and has, as its utter limit, the total absence of the traits which make up this structure. Disintegration consists in the absence of the ability to possess, determine and govern oneself and in the consequent lack of transcendence (194). Other dimensions of disintegration have to do with the break-down of the unity of those structures of the person which involve knowledge and affectivity (193). The deepest sense of integration and disintegration is reached only on the ethical level.

The activity of integration is seen by Wojtyła as a special human task. Its meaning and scope are further developed in the author's work, *Amour et Responsabilité*. There Wojtyła shows impressively what an important and difficult task it is for man to bring the diverse tendencies and acts of his nature into a deep inner unity; the many kinds of attraction and response which bind us to a beloved person can easily become disassociated, especially in the love between man and woman. It is not sufficient that all the elements, the physical sexual attraction, instincts and drives, feeling and will, the surrender to the other person because of his value, tenderness, the interest in his happiness and the desire for union with him are all present in a human relation. Rather, only when these moments cease to be associated merely in terms of an exterior unity, only when they are integrated elements of a unity in which man's spiritual life and love forms (and fills with new meaning) all the other elements — only then is the task of integration fulfilled.

Integration as a result is the integrity and unity of the whole human person as a consequence of the activity of integration.

Various Dimensions of Integration

Now, what are the elements to which this unification refers? The answer is: all the aspects of distinction and potential division in the human person.

1. Integration as a consequence of “vertical transcendence”

There is first of all the duality of man's freedom, which distinguishes him from the animal, and of his instincts and everything that “happens in him.” In virtue of his free self-possession man ought to govern himself and is called to transcendence in the various senses discussed before.

Hence, a certain unification of man's being occurs each time man's self-governance is exercised; a certain integration exists even as long as the formal faculty of freedom is preserved. Man falls apart into disintegration whenever the faculty of self-governance is impaired and whenever the ordering between the governing and governed self gives place to a (temporary) destruction of this complex unity in which alone the true unity of man can be achieved. Besides the disintegration in the medical and psychological sense which is found in

each falling short of normal self-possession, there are also other, preponderantly moral reasons for man's losing control of himself and falling back to a quasi "animal" level of being dominated by nature rather than governed by freedom. One can interpret Wojtyła's book by saying that what constitutes the unity of being in the animal, namely a purely sensitive instinctual life "lived and determined" by nature, would — even if man could attain it — not mean unity but disintegration for man. For the unity to which man is called is always a bringing into unity of complex elements and "parts" of man's nature. This complex unity involves the duality of the governing (free) and the governed self. Hence, both the medical and moral form of disintegration have their metaphysical presupposition in the fact that man is called to the unity of a complex structure which necessarily involves self-possession and self-governance in freedom.

The first kind of unity then which ought to be affirmed and established in and by man through integration is the unity between man as a free personal agent and man as nature or as an instinctual being in whom there are many *appetitus*, strivings, drives, instincts and feelings which are quite independent from his autodetermination and freedom.

This sense of integration corresponds first of all to what Wojtyła calls the "vertical transcendence" in man, i.e. the possibility of man to make himself free from "being lived" by his nature like an animal. This vertical transcendence consists in, and is achieved by, any act of free self-governance and auto-determination. If man fails to actualize this vertical transcendence, his integrity is impaired. Man then seeks — in an ultimately impotent way — to behave "like an animal" and to abrogate his free self-governance. Behaving in this way, man does not reach the integrity of the animal but will be a victim of disintegration because in such a state man's instinctual inclinations are not united with his personal free center and free acting. Then what merely happens in man is not integrated with his freedom. The complex unity of human nature remains unactualized.

Considered in this way, "integration" seems to be the same as "vertical transcendence" or a simple necessary effect of it. What does it mean then, however, to assert with Wojtyła that integration is more than just an effect of vertical transcendence and that the latter would move in a "structural void" without integration? What sense does it make to say that integration is different from vertical transcendence and complementary to it? (189-190)

2. *Integration as more than an effect of "vertical transcendence": the wholeness of man.*

Both the analyses of *The Acting Person* and of *Amour et Responsabilité* seem to give an answer to this question. The idea is that self-governance and the actualization of freedom should not merely stand side by side with man's instincts, drives and feelings. The theme developed in *Amour et Responsabilité* is that of the integration of freedom, emotions, and sexuality in love and marriage. The sexual attraction between man and woman, for example, which "happens in man" without the actualization of his freedom and "spirit," should not stand only side by side with man's freedom, his free response to the intrinsic value of the person who is *affirmabilis propter seipsum* and whom we are never allowed to use merely as a means. (This last thesis is the "personalistic principle" which Wojtyła develops, incorporating contributions both of Kant and of value philosophers; the development of a personalistic ethics by Wojtyła leads to the Cracovian ethical school which will be discussed below.) In man, there should not be a purely animal sexuality which stands alongside the spiritual relations to another human being.

To understand this, precisely means to understand that integration is more than vertical transcendence. It is an active gathering into unity of drives and of value response, of the perception of the dignity of another person and of an instinctual being attracted to the other; of what happens in man and of his free self-governing, etc. Man must be made whole, that which is lower and independent from man's spirit and freedom, must be made subservient to that which is higher in man.

Such a unification and integration does not yet happen when man's instincts obey his freedom in some sense, or when they become in some fashion conditions for man's spiritual life. In fact, this integration does not even yet occur when the spirit, as Scheler suggests, uses energies of vitality. Rather, man's drives and instinctual life ought to become formed and transformed by the spirit and by freedom. In marriage, for example, the bodily expression of love should be an "embodiment" and "fulfillment" of a love which is spiritual; at the same time, the totality of human nature should be fulfilled in the right order. This is in marriage

what integration as a state consists in. There is also a sense of integration which implies that man is rightly ordered in relation to the whole of being. In this dimension, integrity is closely related to what Augustine calls *ordo amoris*. Wojtyła's analyses lead also to the recognition of the connections between integration and soma and between integration and the various dimensions of transcendence.

3. Integration and the various dimensions of transcendence

The “vertical transcendence” of man's free self-governance and of his free dominion over the body should not merely be integrated with what happens in man, in particular with his instincts and drives. Rather, the wholeness and integrity of man as a person also requires that, instead of us gaining a mere formal dominion over ourselves and our bodies, our freedom be based on the recognition of the truth. Our free decisions ought to be based on the truth about being. Moreover, our free acts ought not only to presuppose the knowledge of truth and of the true dignity and value of beings; they ought also to conform to the dignity of being, they should be an affirmation of beings which is due to them because of their intrinsic excellence and value. Free value responses ought to stand in accordance with the true value and rank of their object. Also the transcendence in conscience, in man's recognition of moral obligations and in his relation to God ought to be included in the wholeness of the human person.

All of these moments of transcendence should be linked organically with the formal vertical transcendence (implied in man's freedom) as well as with each other, with man's instinctual life, and with the human body as carrying out human actions.

Therefore, a man like Nietzsche's “overman,” who governs himself, but without basing his decisions on the truth or the good, is not integrated. His self-governance and the undeniable formal vertical transcendence implied in it is not integrated with the call to transcendence in the sense of the adequate response to goods endowed with values.

Again, a man who gives in his inner life the right volitional response to other persons because of their inherent dignity (e.g., Marmeladov in Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment*, who gives in many respects the right inner response to his family), but whose actions do not carry out this response, is not integrated. His being given to alcohol or his laziness prevent his soma-related life from being integrated with his spiritual life.

Again, if a person is deeply dedicated to goods because of their intrinsic value and if he spends his life in their service but prescind from the question of truth about them and, like Cervantes' Don Quixote in his relation to Dulcinea, serves the noble even when he knows it is based on illusion, then this person is not integrated. A traditionalist in a false sense who affirms the good only inasmuch as it is embodied in his tradition and who prescind from the all-important question of truth which lies necessarily beyond any particular “tradition,” such a man is not integrated in Wojtyła's sense.

Integration ought not only to occur in the actual sphere but in the habitual sphere of human attitudes as well.

4. Integration, Soma and Psyche

Man is a psycho-physical unity in distinction (196ff.). Consequently, the human body is far more than merely a material unity of a material thing. The human body is even far more than the physical being of man unified by a purely biological finality which keeps the different organic functions of the body in inner unity. The body is also a *lived body* (organism). As such, the body is experienced from within and profoundly related to man's spiritual-psychical life (200 ff.).

As “lived body,” the human soma has its own dynamisms which do not merely derive from its organic structure but also from its aspect as lived body with the instincts and drives man experiences in himself.

Hence we do not merely find ourselves inevitably united with our body; the psycho-physical unity of man does not give rise only to the fact that our body belongs to our being and that we *have* our body in a unique sense of “having.” (206). Rather, the deeper psycho-somatic unity to which man is called can be achieved only as a fruit of man's integration in the sense of his establishing a profound unity between the lived body experience and transcendence (197). While man's spiritual life is internally independent from matter, it can exert a profound

formative influence on the body (202). This destination of man's spiritual life to "form" the body calls for integration.

In the fully human action the unfree dynamisms are not merely gathered as in a sum-total. Rather, all of these dynamisms receive a new specifically personal meaning and value which transcends by far what bodily dynamisms are as mere dynamisms of the soma. The same principle applies to man's immanent psychical dynamisms. Integration occurs when man's bodily and psychical being is introduced to a higher level of meaning and unity which can never be derived from, or reduced to, man's psycho-somatic unity in the empirical sense (198-199). (Very similar views have been expressed already by Gregory of Nyssa in his analyses of the relation of the human body to the "logos," i.e., meaning, spirit. The view that also man's spiritual life, while internally independent from the body in a profound way, is the "form" of the human body, has been recently expressed also by J. Seifert in *Das LeibSeele-Problem in der gegenwärtigen philosophischen Diskussion*. Darmstadt, 1979).

Integration is such a powerful principle of unification that it allows a certain overstepping of the dividing line between what merely happens in man and human action. The meaning of such an integration and lifting up of non-free acts into the domain of freedom is best seen in the way in which freedom can "appropriate" certain spiritual emotions (224-227; 239).

This aspect of integration has been studied by D. von Hildebrand under the name of "cooperative freedom," the freedom to sanction and thereby to "appropriate" adequate affective value responses by freedom, to form them from within so as to make them free acts. Only the positive aspects of cooperative freedom seem to belong directly to the process of integration in Wojtyła's sense.

The "negative" side of cooperative freedom, the ability to "disavow" feelings of envy or hate, etc., would not be an aspect of integration. The freedom to "decapitate" morally evil feelings from within and thereby to disassociate one's free self from them plays of course indirectly a decisive role in the process of the integration of the person. This use of freedom protects the work of integration from its "adversaries"; a person who fails to break — by not disavowing his feelings of anger, bitterness, envy, etc. — his solidarity with evil emotions is not integrated even if his will as such is directed towards the good.

Another important aspect of integration concerns the bodily expression of man's spiritual life (204-205). The human body is in a sense the fulfillment of man's personal life (205). Hence, a person who fails to relate properly to his body, who fails to bodily express his intentions, his concern, his love (of course in a way appropriate to the respective relation to another person) fails to be fully integrated. Many persons suffer from inhibitions, neuroses, or wrong attitudes in virtue of which they are unable to express their inner life in a smile, a gesture signs of tenderness and affection, etc.; as a result, also their children spouses, or friends may suffer from such persons' inability physically to radiate their spiritual being and attitudes.

Human integration in its somatic aspects unfolds itself also specifically in actions in which our body plays an important role in the realization of a state of affairs. In such cases an action involves a synthesis between personal act and motion. Also skills play an important role in this aspect of integration (212-213).

The somatic aspects of integration cannot be understood without grasping the metaphysical roots of human instincts as well as their transcendent incorporation in higher goods. This applies especially to the instincts of self-preservation and of sexual reproduction (217-219). These instincts are linked to the good of existence, our own existence as well as (in procreation) that of our children. Biological integration of man is therefore never to be found on a merely biological and psychological level. It can only occur when the objective finality of these instincts and their relation to the existence of persons (in their dignity) is recognized and duly respected. Also the relation between human creativity and divine creativity in procreation are aspects relevant in this context. These points have been much further developed and discussed in Wojtyła's book, *Amour et Responsabilité*.

None of the aspects of integration can be properly conceived without grasping that the spiritual soul of man is the deepest and ultimate principle of human integrity (205).

I prescind here from the important analyses of the various modes of intellectual understanding, perception of values, emotivity and feeling which play a significant role in the process of integration. Suffice it to say that Wojtyła shows a deep understanding of the phenomenological contribution (of Scheler, Hildebrand and others) towards the recognition

that among feelings and emotions we find spiritual, intentional feelings which are appropriately related to objects and which can in no way be identified with the irrational or animal aspects of the human being (223-258).

5. Integration and participation

Another important aspect of integration refers to the fact that the unification achieved by it does not only refer to the inner unity of man but also to the unity between man and other beings.

Integration is by no means to be understood in an “entelechia” sense in which one would reduce the integrity of man to an immanent unity of all powers and faculties within man. This is already excluded in light of the fact that integration of the person involves the various dimensions of transcendence which relate man appropriately to beings outside of himself, as we have seen. (G. E. Moore has contributed significantly to the understanding of this important aspect of integration in chapter vi of his *Principia Ethica*.) Thus integration is related to *participation* (chapter vii).

Man's life and action cannot be severed from the community in which man lives and acts “together with others.” The participatory aspects of cooperation, of working and being with others, involve much more than a mere acting together with others. To act in social involvements and in community presupposes relations among the individual persons who are members of a community. The reality of the community which unites persons in an “interior” fashion is equally presupposed for genuine social participation. Also the value of the human action as a *personal* act, its value as *morally good* act (this distinction is explained on pp. 320-322), the dignity and value of persons and of their mutual affirmation in love, play an important role in the formation of community and in participation.

It is of the essence of the community and of the participation which lies at its core that both community and individuality are equally fully realized. As soon as the individual is treated disrespectfully or violated, the association of persons is profoundly altered in its nature. Instead of remaining a community it turns into a collectif (325). Hence in mass-psychological phenomena, in which one finds some “acting together” without any actualization of the individual person and of the truly communal aspects, one finds disintegration and the opposite of participation (326). Instead of viewing the individual and community as opposites one should recognize that precisely the highest self-fulfillment and value of the individual and his actions is conducive to, and perfectly compatible with, community. Hence both totalitarianism (in which the individual is oppressed) and individualism (in which the individual is played out against community) are in opposition to true community. Both are perverse absolutizations of either the individual or community which objectively belong together and are recognized in their full value and true nature only when both are grasped fully. Thus both totalitarianism and individualism fail to understand participation (329 ff.).

While the isolation of persons from each other is a great evil, so is also a “community” which is an enemy of the individual person and of his value. Totalitarianism, inasmuch as it falsifies the true nature of the person as well as that of communal participation, is only a “reverse individualism.” Both systems contain impersonalistic and anti-personalistic concepts of man.

The “common good” plays a crucial role in the foundation of community. So does love and the commandment of love which ultimately coincides with the principle of personalistic ethics the fulfillment of which leads both to true community and to participation. The topic of participation as well as the theme of personalistic ethics has been developed in various articles by Wojtyła.

The emphasis on community among persons as presupposing precisely moral value, and the understanding of integration as a transcendent unity of persons with other (personal) beings indicates the direction in which a certain impression of one-sidedness given by earlier passages in *The Acting Person* is overcome. The impression of such a one-sidedness could be created by the emphasis on freedom as self-possession, as self-determination, and as having the agent as its primary “object,” etc. It may appear as if the highest value of the person were seen in the moral goodness of an isolated individual. Yet it seems clear that an ethics according to which the deepest moral value of the person lies in the loving affirmation of the object-person of moral acts does not indulge in an isolation of the moral value of the individual but opens the way for the understanding of the ultimate role of community and love. In such an

ethics the emphasis on the fact that moral goodness is the highest value to be realized by the person does not exclude that stress be laid on the ultimate metaphysical significance of community and love. For only in the good is true community possible; and the morally good, loving affirmation of persons, when mutual, is not merely not to be divorced from community but also constitutes its very core and foundation.

Moral goodness is not merely the presupposition of community. Rather, the being which leads to true community and the object contemplated in community is precisely the person as loving and as morally good. Moral goodness does not lead us away from the dignity of the person and of community. It is inseparable from the full thematicity of the person and of love and community in which alone moral goodness can unfold. The value of love and community in turn is actualized only in and through moral goodness and to some extent coincides with it.

Another question which poses itself after the study of *The Acting Person* centers on the primary emphasis which seems to be put on the freedom of choice (100, 115, 120, 121, 123, 132, etc.). If we recall the change in Augustine from the earlier definition of freedom as the ability to choose between good and evil and the later definition which is amply discussed by Anselm of Canterbury in *De Libertate Arbitrii*, it seems clear that the deepest dimensions of freedom lie beyond the decision and choice between good and evil. Thus the question arises whether the freedom of man can be adequately described by such formulations of the experience of freedom as: "I may but I need not" (100).

In answer to this difficulty one could perhaps point out that the experience of "I may but I need not" can not only refer to the freedom of choice (between good and evil) but also to the essence of freedom. For free acts do not originate in the needs and the "must" of nature but depend on the free center of the subject. The spontaneous autodetermination of the person leads to the bringing forth from one's self a free act, a yes or no to a being. Even when either the yes or the no is excluded and not even considered, a response, in order to be free, implies an absence of a "need" or necessity which comes from nature inasmuch as it is distinct from freedom.

Many further statements, such as that there is no experience of man's soul (257, 186), statements regarding the relation between soul and psyche, formulations such as that man "creates himself in action" (69), etc. may call for further clarification and critical investigation. But the depth and fundamental philosophical importance of *The Acting Person* as well as the rich and faithful contact with the reality of things which characterizes the book seem to suggest answers to all these possible queries, answers which are in keeping both with "things themselves" and with the clear intentions of the author. Thus, while I have some questions concerning certain theses expressed in the book, I find myself in a complete basic agreement with it. But much more is at stake than a personal agreement. It seems that the book, like other authentically philosophical works which remain faithful to reality, lends a voice to the things themselves and unfolds feature after feature of that "most interesting thing itself": the person.

THE CRACOW/LUBLIN SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY (ETHICS)

The Cracovian or Lublin school of philosophy is primarily concerned with ethics. Here again it was the work of Ingarden, especially his book *On Responsibility*,²⁶ and Wojtyła's writings, mainly his work, *Love and Responsibility*,²⁷ which could be considered the most influential works — at least as far as I can gather from those writings by Cracovian philosophers which have already been translated from the original Polish.

²⁶ Roman Ingarden, *Von der Verantwortung* (Stuttgart, 1970).

²⁷ *Amour et Responsabilité* (not yet in English). The new German translation is *Liebe und Verantwortung* (Munich, 1979).

Tadeusz Styczen

But instead of reporting here on the important ethical works of Ingarden and Wojtyła, I have rather chosen to introduce the readers of this journal to some other thinkers of the Cracovian school, especially to the important contemporary ethicist, Tadeusz Styczen, successor to Wojtyła in his chair at the University of Lublin.

In an article which has been published recently in German, "Zur Frage einer unabhängigen Ethik,"²⁸ Styczen builds on Wojtyła's work, but develops it and unfolds ethical issues in a highly original manner.

The work takes its starting point from the observation that the question of an "autonomous" ethics as well as the question whether there is such a thing as a "religious" or a "Christian" ethics has to turn first to the decisive problem of what exactly ethics itself is. Only after having gained a sufficiently clear conception of ethics as a theory of moral ought (113) can the two mentioned questions be answered.

In the search for finding an answer to the question what *ethics qua ethics* is, we are of course faced with a long series of difficult problems such as whether there is even one single "essence of ethics" which binds together all the different forms in which ethics has historically been presented; or the question whether any ethics which has recourse to presuppositions of metaphysics and philosophy of man which lie outside of ethics already implies a heteronomy of ethics.

The question of whether there is an "autonomous ethics" in the threefold sense of an ethics independent from faith, an ethics independent from any metaphysical and anthropological presuppositions, and an ethics which does justice to the specific proprium of moral goodness and oughtness (and does not subordinate morality to something else such as happiness to which it would be reduced) emerges as the central problem of the article, surrounded by many other questions.

1. Eudaimonism and the independence of ethics

Thomas Aquinas undoubtedly held the view, revolutionary at his time, that there is an independent ethics in the sense of an ethics which grasps the moral nature and principles of human acts without any reference to revelation. The question poses itself, however, what St. Thomas' view concerning ethics is. It is according to him a theory of morality, but this answer leaves us faced with two further problems:

1. What is meant by "morality" here?
2. Is ethics as a theory of morality independent not only from theology but also from philosophy?

As far as the essence of moral goodness is concerned, Thomas follows Aristotle in holding that the moral goodness of actions is determined by their relation to the final goal of man, *eudaimonia*, understood as that realization of the self which constitutes the essence of happiness. One could call this conception of ethics a teleological ethics, i.e. one which views the goodness of acts as dependent on the final end of all human acts and of the moral agent himself. While Thomas accepts this view from Aristotle, his approach to ethics differs perhaps in that he takes the final end of man's life, the *visio beatifica*, as a given and explains human actions in relation to it. Aristotle, however, penetrates first into the structure of human actions and believes he discovers in them their teleological directedness to the final end (*omnis agens agit propter finem*), lastly to the final end of the *eudaimonia* as the most perfect actualization of the most perfect faculty of man (contemplative knowledge) in relation to the most perfect object (120121). (This statement does not refer to other more "complete" notions of happiness in Aristotle, e.g. the passages where he counts all goods of fortune among the conditions of happiness.)

But in both ethical systems *eudaimonia* remains the decisive point of reference; actions are morally good when they lead to happiness, morally evil when they frustrate happiness, morally not obligatory when they fail to promote *eudaimonia*. The decisive question in an interpretation of Thomas remains here whether Thomas is an eudaimonist and also whether the final end of man is that which he necessarily wills and cannot even not will,

²⁸ Tadeusz Styczen, "Zur Frage einer unabhängigen Ethik," in: *Der Streit um den Menschen, Personaler Anspruch des Sittlichen*, pp.111-175.

namely happiness, as Thomas and Aristotle conceive of it, or whether the final end of man is linked to what he *ought to will* and *must not not will* (121).

Do we have to do with an eudaimonistic praxology in which every “I ought to” is ultimately reduced to or derived from an “I will,” or do we have to do with a theory of the moral ought as categorical?

Styczen suggests that Thomas is quite clearly convinced that the teleological Aristotelian theory of morality is adequate (122). This conclusion opens the critical section of Styczen's treatment of eudaimonism (122).

The assumption that morality can be explained teleologically by its reference to *eudaimonia* fails to do justice to the essential character of morality, Styczen holds. This essence of morality appears in a deed of mercy such as that of the good Samaritan but also in the moral act of Antigone in Sophocles' play of that name. The moral obligation to respect the dignity of the deceased brother called Antigone precisely to sacrifice her happiness. Should this be immoral, or is it not rather an evident example of high morality which can be grasped even when no reference to a final *post-mortem* happiness of Antigone is made? If this (rhetorical) question is to be answered in the affirmative, it becomes clear, Styczen argues, that the ethics of Aristotle or Thomas is perhaps not even really an ethics, i.e., a theory of morality, but only a theory of happiness. The really and authentically *moral* ought does not even seem to be brought into sight in this philosophy of “morality as a way to happiness” (122).

As far as the second sense of an “independent ethics” is concerned, i.e. an ethics which is independent from philosophy, it is clear that if the moral quality of acts is only derived from the ultimate end of human actions, no discipline besides philosophy (if we prescind here from theology) can investigate the sphere of morality.

Mill, Schlick and many other modern ethicists have defended the thesis that ethics is an empirical science and should depend on psychology as one of its subdivisions. But these empiricist views of morality often share with Aristotelian ethics the element of interpreting human actions teleologically; abandoning philosophical reflection on the ultimate end of man, they interpret moral acts in terms of their directedness towards pleasure or other “ends” for which the good behavior is an appropriate means. Also this ethical view leads to a denial of an important sense of “independence” of ethics, perhaps the most important one, the denial that ethics has a subject-matter of its own: the moral goodness of acts and the essence of moral oughtness which can never be explained by simply saying that moral behavior is the means for something completely different, which has first to be known in order to know what morality is, and which alone is ultimately important.

The reviewer believes that these are again two different questions: the question whether morality is only the means for something else and the question whether the understanding of morality requires that one first know something different from morality, such as the value of the person.

The main criticism of a eudaemonistic and teleological ethics offered by Styczen is that this theory eliminates the “selflessness” of the moral act and the character of “unconditionedness” which is of the essence of the moral ought (126) A moral obligation impels us to perform a certain action regardless of the ends of the moral subject, in a sense even in renunciation to these desired ends. (This holds true even if the subject desires this end with all intensity and knows that he can attain it — happiness — only if he does what is morally good.)

Commitment, sacrifice, or the giving of one's life impel us to a profound admiration, which the teleological eudaemonist, however, would immediately have to take back, so to speak, when it occurred to him that a person giving his life for his friends may not even think of his own happiness, and still less be motivated by it. Self-fulfillment, as Styczen puts it, does not belong to the moral action *per se* but *per accidens*. This applies even to the case of the moral obligation to respect one's own person (127). In such cases the dignity of our own person or of another person is really the ground of the moral ought. When this point is missed, both the moment of unconditionedness in the moral imperative and the moment of selflessness in the moral action are radically overlooked. (127-128). This criticism of eudaemonism, while developed originally and in a genuinely philosophical manner by Styczen, clearly goes back to Wojtyła's own ethical work.²⁹

²⁹. That this is also Wojtyła's view cannot only be gathered from *Amour et Responsabilité* and other works of his; it has also been stated by Styczen in his article, "Karol Wojtyła — Philosoph der Freiheit im Dienst der Liebe," in: K.

2. Deontonomism and Independence of Ethics

In order to overcome the two main weaknesses of a teleological eudaemonistic ethics, namely the failure to grasp the selflessness of the moral act and the unconditional character of moral obligations, many thinkers turned to some authority or law-giving instance. A deed is morally obligatory because it is commanded by an authority.

Some held that the commanding authority lies outside of the subject, in God, society, state, custom, etc. Styczen calls this view which sees the ultimate origin of all moral obligations in an authority outside of the person “heteronomistic deontonomism.” (129). Against this view Styczen argues first that it leaves unexplained how the exterior commandment — especially when it goes against the subject's inner convictions (Styczen sees this as the central conflict described by Kierkegaard in *Fear and Trembling* in his analysis of the case of Abraham and Isaac) — can explain the inferiority with which the moral obligation binds the subject from within and not only from without. One could raise here the question whether this problem does not have to be solved by everyone who holds (as Styczen himself would) that positive commandments issued by a legitimate authority impose moral obligations upon a person. Perhaps Styczen would reply that the moral obligation can never simply coincide with the positive commandment as such and cannot be reduced to the “fact that something is positively commanded by an authority.” But then the deontonomist could answer that he is willing to make a distinction between the moral obligation *grounded in* the positive commandment, and this commandment itself.

I cannot see how Styczen's first objection would hold against this last version of heteronomous deontonomism. In light of this fact a far stronger argument Styczen advances against this position seems to be the following one: any obligation derived from a positive commandment cannot be ultimate in the sense that it is always possible and necessary to ask for the ground of the given authority and for the justification of the commandment. And in answer to this question the mere fact that something is commanded can never be the sufficient basis for a moral obligation. Moreover, if there are no grounds of moral obligations and moral “norms” which are independent from, and have to be respected by positive commandments, authority loses all meaning and justification and becomes brute power. Hence it is not too strong a statement to say with Styczen that heteronomous deontonomism (which is inspired by Kelsen's theory of law) wholly loses sight of what it intends to explain: morality (130).

In order to escape the absurdities of heteronomous deontonomism other thinkers developed the theory that the subject of action himself can give to himself commandments which oblige him morally. This view, so its proponents thought, avoids any heteronomy of moral duty and fully does justice to the inferiority of the moral obligation. Such an autonomistic deontonomism (of, e.g., Kant or Sartre), however, must answer the question: what is the ground for the binding character of the commandment the subject gives to himself? (132) Only some form of ethical intuition which grasps the “things themselves” can be the source of an answer to this question (133). Such an ethical intuition however does not bring to light any justification of autonomistic ethics. On the contrary, such an ethical intuition into the essence of moral oughtness brings to light the absurdity and falsity of this position. The unconditional character of moral obligations can precisely *not* be the consequence of a moral commandment given by myself to myself. No contract I make with myself, no will to remain

Wojtyła — Johannes Paul II, *Erziehung zur Liebe* (Augsburg, 1979), p. 156 ff. Wojtyła objected to Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics 1. that it contradicts moral experience by claiming that morally good acts are motivated by the ultimate end of happiness, 2. that it fails to recognize the unconditional character of the moral ought (an objection which goes also against M. Scheler who failed to see the moment of obligation, p. 158 ff.). 3 that it fails to recognize the selflessness of the moral act (156 f.) Happiness is the *consequence* and reward of moral goodness, not its “end” or (only and ultimate) motivating ground, as Aristotle and Thomas claimed. (157 ff.). The morally good act is an affirmation of being (a person) because of its value (163-165). This does not contradict the truth — often stressed in the Polish school — that moral goodness is the only way to true happiness and that there is an ultimate and necessary metaphysical link between morality and happiness. But, as Styczen repeatedly emphasises, this does not make happiness the motive and end, and morality the means for it. In my book, *Was ist und was motiviert eine sittliche Handlung?* (Salzburg: A. Pustet, 1976), I argued in addition that happiness may even be a secondary and subordinate motive of the moral action, but never its primary motive.

See especially Wojtyła's article referred to in note 22, where he expresses his concept of metaphysics in the sense of “phenomenological realism and metaphysics”: “Das Wort ‘metaphysisch’ verstehen wir hier nicht als ‘praeterphänomenal’ sondern als ‘transphänomenal’. d. h. nicht ‘neben’ oder ‘über’ den Phänomenen, sondern in ihnen und durch die Erscheinungsformen hindurch, die uns in der Erfahrung den ganzen Menschen als seienden und handelnden aufweisen, müssen wir das Subjekt dieses Seins und Handelns erblicken” (19)

faithful to my own orders, no will never to contradict myself, no faithfulness towards my own law-giving will, etc., can sufficiently explain the evident facts: 1. I cannot freely cancel a moral obligation. (I ought to be able to do this if the obligation was imposed upon myself by my will in the first place.) 2. The subject faced with a moral obligation finds himself bound by it, subjected to it prior to any will on his part; the subject finds and discovers the obligation as something which confronts him independently from any willing on his part. Even the most careful analysis does not bring to light a free commitment on my part to obey my own orders as the root of my finding myself obliged. (Also when a free commitment on my part, e.g., a promise lies at the root of the moral obligation, the latter is grounded in the objective nature of — e.g., the promise and is by no means the result of a self-commanding will.) Nor will such an analysis succeed in showing that there is any act of self-command which I give to myself. I may wish not to be obliged. To postulate a transcendental ego wholly withdrawn from experience which gives self-commands and commits itself to obeying them seems a totally unfounded construction which has no basis in moral experience; it even contradicts moral experience which discloses the origins of moral obligation to us. The hypothesis of a non-experienced self-commanding ego is therefore not only unfounded, it runs counter to the given.

Precisely the rightful “autonomy” of the moral subject who is only bound when the voice of his conscience speaks proves this point. For the voice of conscience appears as an approbation in the subject of the obligation, which is pre-given to conscience and to the subject and which is discovered as the *ground* of conscience. Certainly, the subject must never disobey the ultimate inner subjective “norm” of morality: the voice of conscience. Yet this voice is not absolute and self-grounding but goes back to the confrontation with a moral obligation that is given to the acting subject as something independent from an act of will on his part, from any self-law-giving will or any other act of free commitment he performs. 3. While it is true that only our own *judgement* of conscience binds us, it is also true that it does not bind us because it is *our* judgement but because it presents itself to us *as true* or because it actually *is true*. Hence the truth about the “things,” the truth which binds us to reality obliges us morally (135). Precisely because the voice of conscience can be built on error, the person is always obliged to control his ethical knowledge and to correct false ethical opinions he has formed which influence his conscience. Autonomistic deontonomism fails to see that the absolute obligation to obey the command of our conscience as ultimate internal authority implies the other absolute moral obligation to further inquire into the objective nature of morality so as to inform our conscience by the ultimate objective norm of moral conduct which lies in the truth about morally relevant reality.

4. Another decisive argument against both heteronomistic and autonomistic deontonomism is the following: the question “why” a certain conduct or act is morally obligatory can never be sufficiently answered by a reference to “blind obedience” in the sense of ungrounded irrational obedience. The “blindness” of my obedience is not less incapable of rendering moral obligations intelligible when it is paid to my own commands than when we obey blindly commands issued by other persons. If the deontonomist resigns himself to the admission of having no further reason to offer for such an obeying, he is forced into an utter irrationalism which leaves the moral sphere unexplained and identifiable with the purely arbitrary. Kant, whose standpoint was criticized by Styczen elsewhere (in Polish publications), is led to the tragic position of denying the subject the right to ask for a justification of the binding character of such a self-law-giving will and thereby he destroys the autonomy he attempts to save, by undermining the very basis of such an autonomy, the rationality of the person without which the person is not the person and hence not “autonomous.” (136). Along the same lines Sartre's position, according to which the subject and freedom are “a nothing” and produce or create from themselves every moral ought, is criticized by Styczen.

The result of all the preceding investigations is a criticism both of Aristotelian-Thomistic teleological ethics and of deontonomism in all forms (138-141).

3. Personalism and Independence of Ethics

In order to do justice to morality, this much is shown by the previous analysis, one has to clearly see four essential marks of morality: its unconditionedness (categorical character of the moral obligation), its “selflessness” (*Uneigennützigkeit*), its “inferiority,” and its “rationality.” In his attempt to do justice to all of these essential traits of morality, Styczen

develops the principles of a personalistic ethics as they have been developed before by Wojtyła in a quite original way under the influence of Scheler's and Hildebrand's ethics. The moral obligation is understood as an unconditioned "ought" which binds someone (subject-person) to affirm someone else (object-person, who can be identical with the subject-person in the case of obligations towards ourselves) in respect to the specific dignity (value) of the person (142).

The personal dignity, the value of the person, explains intelligibly 1) the ground of the unconditional obligation to affirm the person; 2) the proper content of the positive (loving) affirmation called for; 3) the selflessness of the moral act insofar as the subject conforms himself to a person because of that person's worth, for his own sake, in the sense of what Hildebrand and Wojtyła have called "value-response." Moreover, this selfless transcending gesture of the morally good act is no longer understood as a blind subordination to an ought which originates in my own blind law-giving will. Rather, the obedience is owed to an intelligibly founded obligation. The surrender is the meaningful loving affirmation due to a good (the person); compared to this, the obedience to my own command is abstract, empty, no selfless donation but a proud self-affirmation. Not merely *some* rational justification for the absolute oughtness of moral obligations is provided by the dignity and value of the person. Rather, the surrender *due to* the person finds here an intelligible foundation which is wholly absent in the deontonomistic systems. An ought is then understood as a commandment issuing forth from the dignity of the person (143).

The correctly understood autonomy of the moral subject, too, finds a justification in this position and here alone, because the inner rational conviction that one is bound in conscience to affirm the other person is the only real ground which can convince the acting person "from within" and "reasonably" that he is obliged.

The archprinciple of personalistic ethics reads *persona est affirmanda* as distinct from Kant's categorical imperative as well as from the vague principle *bonum est faciendum*. *Persona ut affirmabilis propter seipsam* explains both the donation - character of the moral act and the irreducible and "original" nature of the moral obligation which goes back to the irreducible nature of value (144). Again, Styczen hints in the direction of a distinction which reminds of Hildebrand's important distinction between those values which make a being "*affirmandum propter seipsum*" in Ia moral sense and those which call for a response only in an extra-moral sense. (A beautiful picture ought to be admired, without the value of such a response — or, as Moore would put it in *Principia Ethica*, ch vi, x — without that "organic unity" grounding any moral value.) Styczen speaks of the irreducible character not only of the good or of value in general, but of the value which can be described as the dignity of the person in which, as he claims, we encounter the ultimate root of all moral obligations (144). In virtue of his dignity, a person does not only call for some response and affirmation due to him, but he calls for such a response in the irreducible sense of founding a "moral obligation." That this dignity of man and of the person qua person grounds moral obligations, has been seen, Styczen points out (146), by many other thinkers, including Kant (who forgets his ethical formalism when he formulates the categorical imperative in its third version in the *Foundations*), Marx and others.

The knowledge at stake when we grasp the moral obligation, *Persona est affirmabilis propter seipsam*, is the knowledge of something irreducible. It is an "immediate intellectual knowledge" which does not presuppose religion or any *Weltanschauung* but which goes back to a "seeing of what man (the person) is" and what is due to a person from another person without respect to anything outside of that person (146-148). Styczen has appeal to a natural "*ecce homo*."

Therefore, insofar as ethics becomes philosophical anthropology and metaphysics, it does not lose its independence; rather, it remains in what is proper to *it* qua ethics, by not erring away from its proper path of investigating morality, into a general ontology as theory of being qua being, or into any other ontological sphere. To do so would lead to a losing sight of the moral or to reducing it to something else; but to go back to the very foundation of all moral obligations, the intrinsic inherent dignity of the person which also man essentially and inalienably possesses as a person (152, 163), is by no means a turning away from the moral but a probing into its intelligible foundations which make us understand what "morality itself" is.

Andrzej Szostek

Andrzej Szostek's article, "Der Ort der Person in der Struktur des Sittlichen" (*ibid.*, p. 71-110) goes in the same direction. It renders especially on the role of the object-person in the structure of morality and in the foundation of the moral norms and obligations (71).

After an interesting analysis of the role of intuition in ethical knowledge, Szostek proceeds, like Styczen, to offer a critique of eudaemonism or "perfectionism." According to this view each man necessarily strives for perfection understood as the complete fulfillment of man's nature. Hence moral evil is either due to ignorance or to a disharmony between reason (nature) and an irrational will which does not subject itself to the dictate of reason (78).

This view implies that the object-person is viewed either as a means towards the perfect fulfillment of the subject of the moral action, or he is approached as an occasion to reach this perfection. Aristotle quite clearly calls morality a means towards the attainment of happiness.

Again, it is not denied by Szostek that morality alone allows man to reach his ultimate goal and happiness. But it is asserted that the question whether a moral act is an effective means towards happiness is in no way what constitutes its moral goodness; its moral goodness depends rather on a prescinding from the point of view of our own happiness and on a simultaneous turning towards the object-person in a self-less concern for him (79). Often there is a clear conflict in a man's consciousness between his own happiness and what is morally good. In such cases it is clear that the (primary) motive for the morally good act *is not* happiness (79-80).

Moreover, the ought of moral obligation comes to the subject as a call from the outside and as a categorical obligation which is decidedly different from any ought which only follows from a predetermined tendency in our nature and only concerns the means to the fulfillment of such a tendency. The "I ought to" cannot be interpreted as a consequence of an "I will."

In these two respects the author agrees with Kant for having brought to our attention both the selflessness of the moral act and the categorical character of the moral obligation. Szostek follows Wojtyła on this point.

His ensuing criticism of Kant's ethics is very similar to the criticism Styczen offers.

In his own discussion of the positive foundations of the moral obligations issuing from the (object-) person, Szostek delves into the foundation of the unique dignity of the person and raises the question what in man is the most "valuable moment" which one ought always to defend and to affirm (91). He also interprets the biblical command of love of neighbor ("whom we should love as ourselves") in this context. He interprets the "as yourself" as not implying a "why" (reason) but as only referring to the solidarity we have with ourselves as a *measure* of the loving care we ought to have for another person (92). The ground of this obligation to affirm and to love another person is not self-love but the-being-a-person-of-man, the presence of a spiritual moment which manifests itself especially in man's transcendence as freedom to act (92).

Instead of speaking of a principle of humanistic ethics, the author prefers to call it "personalistic." (93). He interprets the fundamental principle of personalistic ethics with Wojtyła "The person possesses such a being that the authentic and full relation to a person is love" (Wojtyła) or more briefly, "the person deserves love" (94). Hence the personalistic principle attempts to provide the rational foundation both for the commandment to love one's neighbor and for Kant's categorical imperative, especially for its third formulation in the *Foundations*. The personal structure of man implies an absolute value from which flows the commandment to affirm the person (95)

One could of course critically ask Szostek and Styczen whether the Christian *caritas* and love of neighbor is not infinitely more than a loving response to the dignity of the person inasmuch as this dignity is accessible to the natural knowledge expressed in the "*ecce homo*" as interpreted by Szostek. One could also pose various other critical questions addressed to the personalistic ethics of the Cracow/Lublin School: are all moral obligations (such as the obligations to tell the truth and not to be cruel towards animals) grounded in the dignity of the person, or are there morally relevant aspects in truth and being as such, in animals, etc.? Moreover, are there not many specifically personal traits of man which are not morally relevant, such as rhetorical or intellectual brilliance as such? If the first question is to be

answered in the affirmative, the principle *persona est affirmanda* seems to be too specific to be the grounding ethical principle; if the second question is answered affirmatively, the principle is still too general (broad) to be the foundation of all moral calls and obligations. Another critical question refers to the problem whether the terms “person” and “man” can so easily be interchanged as the various formulations of the basic moral norm and ethical knowledge (“the person deserves love,” “*ecce homo*”) seem to suggest.

Probably the members of the Cracow/Lublin School would reply that the affirmation and love of persons is founded on the deeper dignity of the person which is precisely that value-dimension of the person which is morally relevant. They might also say that, while not all moral obligations go back to the dignity of the person, the most important ones do go back to the person. Hence the principle of personalistic ethics can stand as a model also for all moral obligations which refer to beings that are analogous to the person, such as animals. As far as the last question is concerned, the defenders of this ethical personalism might say that man is not the only but the only experienced person and therefore man provides the most evident example of the person and its dignity. It cannot be investigated in the context of this report whether these replies sufficiently answer our critical questions. Suffice it to say that the incompleteness which is perhaps found in the foundation of ethics outlined above would in no way diminish the full validity, originality, and depth of the ethical break-through which lies in the ethical insights discussed in this report.

The remaining part of Szostek's article attempts to develop a critique of situationist ethics by hinting at the possibility of deriving universally valid norms for human conduct on the basis of an analysis of what constitutes the dignity of the person and of which obligations in regard to human actions (directed at other persons or at ourselves) follow necessarily from the dignity of the person.

“Christian Existentialism” in the Cracow School. A “Marcelian” Dimension

Of the works of other authors who belong to the dynamic circle of Cracow-Lublin philosophers, one should mention here at least the name of Stanislaw Grygiel, editor of the journal *Znak* (the sign). His book, *L'Uomo visto dalla Vistola* (Bologna, 1978), contains a collection of highly interesting essays. His thinking shows a remarkable similarity to the thought of Gabriel Marcel. The attitude of objectifying another person, of turning him into an object of manipulation, is in an impressive way contrasted with the genuine attitude of love and respect for another person. Grygiel's observations on the encounter (*incontro*) between persons are also close to Marcel's. So are his reflections on those dimensions of the meaning of human life and of the ego (*io*) which are inseparable from the opening up and giving of oneself to another person, to a thou. Grygiel's thoughts on immortality based on the experience of love, of community and of a genuine “we,” and many other analyses remind the reader of key themes in Marcel's thought. This is especially true of the first article, “Profanazione, ovvero Contemplazione e Sacramento” (17 ff.). Another remarkably “Marcelian” dimension in Grygiel's thought consists in his close contact with literature.

In this regard, however, also the influence Wojtyła's poetry has had on the Cracow-Lublin circle of Polish philosophers is manifest. More like some of Wojtyła's poems than like his purely philosophical works, Grygiel's philosophical essays are animated by a direct and immediate Christian dimension in which philosophy and faith are linked without any attempt of keeping philosophical insight clearly distinct from reflections of the believer.

Grygiel is an original young Polish thinker who expresses his own philosophical and existential contact with reality. Above and beyond being influenced by the “existentialism” in Wojtyła's poetry and in Gabriel Marcel's theatrical and philosophical *Oeuvre*, Grygiel's essays have their origin in the author's encounter with reality.

Other Authors and Trends
in the Cracow/Lublin School

It would undoubtedly be wrong to speak of one Cracow/Lublin School of Philosophy. There are not only many different interests (logic, ethics, philosophy of language, etc.) and various partly conflicting philosophical views represented at the University of Lublin itself, but there are also some tensions between the “Lublin-Thomists” and the more (realist) phenomenological school at Cracow (represented not only by the Znak and by the circle of followers of R. Ingarden, but also by many members of the faculty of the Pontifical Institute of Theology, the PIT, in Cracow, and by Wojtyła himself, the founder of the PIT).

The ideal solution and answer to such tensions seems to lie in an unconditional love of the truth wherever it may be found. This attitude of profound openness to the truth is beautifully exemplified in Wojtyła's, Styczen's, Poltawski's and other Polish philosophers' work. (Unfortunately, it was only possible for us to comment here on a small fraction of the significant philosophical studies that have arisen out of the singularly dynamic and inspiring philosophical atmosphere of Cracow and Lublin.)

We hope that such an openness to any truth found in the various philosophical schools, combined with the uncompromising critical attempt to overcome errors in even the most magnificent and venerable philosophical traditions, and in our own “school,” — an attitude which deserves the name “eclecticism” no more than St. Thomas' great *Summae* — may more and more be the model for the work undertaken in this journal.